

The Department of State

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Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of inter-
national affairs and the functions of
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national interest.*

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of international relations, are listed
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Providing Assistance to the People of Yugoslavia

[Released to the press by the White House November 24]

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMEN OF PERTINENT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

The President today sent the following letter to Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Senator Millard E. Tydings, chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; Representative John Kee, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services.

The drought, the consequent crop failure and the imminence of famine in Yugoslavia is a development which seriously affects the security of the North Atlantic area. These events dangerously weaken the ability of Yugoslavia to defend itself against aggression, for, among other consequences, it imperils the combat effectiveness of the Yugoslav armed forces.

Yugoslavia, moreover, is a nation whose strategic location makes it of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area. This importance derives from Yugoslavia's geographic relationship to Austria on the north, where the occupation forces of certain North Atlantic Treaty countries, including the United States, are on duty, Greece on the south, and Italy on the west.

As a result of these factors, an immediate increase in Yugoslavia's ability to defend itself over that which would exist if no assistance were supplied will contribute to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. The governments of the other nations which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty have been consulted on this point. It is a settled premise of our foreign policy that the peace and security of the North Atlantic area is vital to the security of the United States.

Accordingly, I have determined that it is essential in order effectively to carry out the purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, to use not to exceed \$16 million of the funds appropriated for the purposes of Title I of the Act to provide food for Yugoslavia in an amount equivalent to the immediate food requirements of its armed forces. This use of these funds is part of the interim aid program to meet the

immediate emergency pending further action by the Congress.

This letter constitutes the notification required by Section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as amended.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

STOP-GAP AID PROGRAM OUTLINED

Yugoslavia has suffered one of the worst droughts in its history, with consequent disastrous effects on food production. In the absence of outside assistance, the Yugoslav people, who have been stoutly resisting the efforts of the Cominform to subject them to foreign domination, will be faced with hunger and starvation in the coming winter. In accordance with our national interests and with the American tradition of helping other peoples in time of dire need, the United States Government has explored ways and means of providing assistance to the people of Yugoslavia.

The formal Yugoslav request for assistance, contained in the note of October 20, 1950, to the United States Government and a supporting memorandum, estimated the total need for food assistance at approximately \$55,000,000. Later, Yugoslav estimates based on data which subsequently became available place the requirements at a considerably higher figure. Independent estimates by the United States Government indicate that approximately \$75,000,000 in food assistance, including ocean transportation costs, will be necessary to meet the critical shortages before the next harvest. Since it is urgent that food reach Yugoslavia very promptly, emphasis has been placed on getting into motion a stop-gap aid program, using the means at hand, to be followed by such additional aid as the Congress may authorize.

It is understood that other countries are also contemplating assistance to Yugoslavia. Any announcement of decisions taken in this regard is a matter for the governments immediately concerned. The British Government made such a statement on November 14.

Stop-Gap Aid Program

The framework of a stop-gap program totalling approximately \$33,500,000 for food purchase and delivery, involving ECA, Export-Import Bank, and MDA funds has been worked out as follows:

I. ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

The Economic Cooperation Administration is making arrangements for the delivery of wheat flour in the approximate amount of \$11,500,000 to Yugoslavia. It will be delivered directly from stocks in Italy and Germany, to be replaced later by equivalent shipments of wheat from the United States to those countries. The Governments of Italy and of the German Federal Republic have, by their cooperation, made it possible to undertake this project and to begin shipments of urgently needed flour to Yugoslavia without delay. An ECA statement on this part of the stop-gap aid program was released on November 17.

2. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

The Export-Import Bank has made or will make available to Yugoslavia credits of approximately \$6,000,000 for the purchase and transport of food (lard, beans, dried eggs, and canned meat). The surplus food commodities are being acquired from the Department of Agriculture.

3. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the United States Government will provide to Yugoslavia certain foodstuffs (including wheat flour, corn, barley, lard, and sugar) to a value not to exceed \$16,000,000, including transportation costs, in support of the estimated requirements of the Yugoslav armed forces during the critical period of food shortage. The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been consulted in accordance with the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The President, exercising the authority given to him by the Act, has determined that the extension of this assistance to Yugoslavia will contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area and is essential for the effective carrying out of the purposes of the Act and has notified accordingly the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House. An agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia covering the terms of the assistance was concluded in Belgrade on November 21, 1950.

Further Recommendations to Congress

The Congress will be asked, when it reconvenes later this month, to authorize and make available funds to be used through June 30, 1951, to provide

the balance of Yugoslavia's food needs. Estimates upon which the request to Congress will be based will take into account such factors as the amount of aid extended by other countries and any later data on the situation in Yugoslavia.

Action by Private Agencies

The United States Government welcomes and encourages the activities of private organizations such as CARE, which are undertaking to increase the dispatch, from private American sources, of food to Yugoslavia.

International Economic Development Program Requested

[Released to the press by the White House November 24]

The President today sent the following letter to Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman of the Advisory Board on International Development.

At the time I requested you to serve as Chairman of the Advisory Board on International Development, I expressed the conviction that any adequate and sound program of international economic development must be both broadly conceived in relation to our national interests and so formulated as to lend itself to realistic and continuing cooperation between private enterprise and government, here and abroad. I regard such a program as vital to the attainment of our goal of an expanding world economy and to the building of the security of the free world.

On March 31, 1950, I requested Mr. Gordon Gray to undertake a comprehensive study of the foreign economic policies and procedures of this Government in the light of present developments and conditions.¹ Mr. Gray has now submitted his report. A reading of it reinforces my conviction that an effective program for international economic development must be integrated both as to policy and operations with all other governmental and private activities relating to the international trade and economic life of the nation.

Our policy in relation to the underdeveloped areas is one of the central points toward which the Gray report is addressed. When that report was made public, I stated that I was asking you to have the Advisory Board "as its first task, consider Mr. Gray's proposals concerning our policy toward the underdeveloped areas in the context of the full report, in order that this Board will be able to give us its views early in the coming year on the types and size of programs which it considers desirable for the United States to undertake in this field."

In accordance with this request, I should like to have the Advisory Board address itself specifically

¹ For excerpts from the Gray report, see BULLETIN OF Nov. 27, 1950, p. 842.

to the consideration of desirable plans to accomplish with maximum dispatch and effectiveness the broad objectives and policies of the Point Four program. In carrying out this task you should take into account existing governmental and private activities bearing on international economic development. You will wish to formulate your recommendations in the light of the Gray report's comprehensive analysis of our entire foreign economic policy.

This is a special task which I am asking the Advisory Board to undertake for me in addition to the duties which are assigned to it under the Act for International Development. In carrying out this task, you may provide yourself and the Advisory Board with such assistants as may be required.

I am hopeful that you may find it possible to make your recommendations to me by the beginning of February of next year.

The various departments and agencies of the Government responsible for our foreign aid programs, in particular the Department of State, are, as you know, now studying the problem of continuation and possible modification of those programs. Those departments and agencies will, of course, extend to you the fullest cooperation in your work.

I am most interested in the work you are undertaking and I know you will apprise me from time to time as to how the work is proceeding.

U.S. Sets Forth Principles for Japanese Peace Treaty

[Released to the press November 24]

U.S. MEMORANDUM TO GOVERNMENTS ON THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

There is given below a brief general statement of the type of Treaty envisioned by the United States Government as proper to end the state of war with Japan. It is stressed that this statement is only suggestive and tentative and does not commit the United States Government to the detailed content or wording of any future draft. It is expected that after there has been an opportunity to study this outline there will be a series of informal discussions designed to elaborate on it and make clear any points which may be obscure at first glance.

The United States proposes a treaty with Japan which would end the state of war, restore Japanese sovereignty and bring back Japan as an equal in the society of free peoples. As regards specific matters, the treaty would reflect the principles indicated below:

1. *Parties.* Any or all nations at war with Japan which are willing to make peace on the basis proposed and as may be agreed.

2. *United Nations.* Membership by Japan would be contemplated.

3. *Territory.* Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and (c) accept the future decision of the U.K., U.S.S.R., China and U.S. with reference to the status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In the event of no decision within a year after the Treaty came into effect, the U.N. General Assembly would decide. Special rights and interests in China would be renounced.

4. *Security.* The Treaty would contemplate that, pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements such as U.N. assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and U.S. and perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

5. *Political and Commercial Arrangements.* Japan would agree to adhere to multilateral treaties dealing with narcotics and fishing. Pre-war bilateral treaties could be revived by mutual agreement. Pending the conclusion of new commercial treaties, Japan would extend most-favored-nation treatment, subject to normal exceptions.

6. *Claims.* All parties would waive claims arising out of war acts prior to September 2, 1945, except that (a) the Allied Powers would, in general, hold Japanese property within their territory and (b) Japan would restore allied property or, if not restorable intact, provide yen to compensate for an agreed percentage of lost value.

7. *Disputes.* Claims disputes would be settled by a special neutral tribunal to be set up by the President of the International Court of Justice. Other disputes would be referred either to diplomatic settlement, or to the International Court of Justice.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE FROM THE U.S.S.R. DATED NOVEMBER 20, 1950

[Unofficial Translation]

On October 26 of this year, during his conversation with J. A. Malik, Mr. Dulles presented a memorandum on the question of the peace treaty with Japan, containing a brief general statement of the type of treaty which, in the opinion of the United States Government, would be suitable for ending the state of war with Japan. In this connection the Soviet Government would like to obtain an explanation on several points of this memorandum.

1. It is a known fact that the United States of America, Great Britain, China, the U.S.S.R. and a number of other states, signatories of the Declaration by United Nations in Washington on January 1, 1942, obligated themselves not to conclude a separate peace with the enemy states.

In as much as the above obligation exists, an explanation is desired as to whether a peace treaty with Japan is contemplated in which are meant to participate the U.S.A., Great Britain, China and the U.S.S.R., in whose name the surrender terms for Japan were signed, as well as any other country which took an active part in the war against Japan, or whether the possibility exists of concluding a separate peace with Japan with only a few of the above-mentioned powers participating.

2. By the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, signed by the U.S.A., Great Britain and China, and the Potsdam Agreement of July 26, 1945, signed by these same countries, joined by the Soviet Union, the question of returning Formosa and the Pescadores to China was decided. In a similar manner the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945, signed by the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., decided the question of returning the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands to the Soviet Union and handing over to her the Kurile Islands.

In as much as the above agreements exist, how should the proposal contained in the memorandum be interpreted which would make the status of Formosa, the Pescadores, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands subject to a new decision by the U.S.A., Great Britain, China and the U.S.S.R., and in case the states mentioned fail to reach an agreement in the course of a year, to a decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

3. Neither the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Agreement mention that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be taken out from under Japanese sovereignty; moreover, in signing those agreements the states announced that they "had no thoughts of territorial expansion."

In this connection the question arises as to what is the basis for the proposal contained in the memorandum to the effect that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations with the United States as the administrative power.

4. It is well known that the Japanese people display deep interest in whether the occupation forces would remain in Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty, all the more so because in the Potsdam Declaration (paragraph 12) it was provided that the occupation troops would be withdrawn from Japan.

In connection with this, the Soviet Government desires to know whether it is contemplated that in the peace treaty with Japan a definite period of time must be provided for the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Japan's territory as provided in peace treaties already concluded with other states.

5. The decision of June 19, 1947, agreed upon between the states which are members of the Far Eastern Commission, adopted on the initiative of the United States of America, provides that Japan will not possess an army, a navy, or an air force.

However, in the memorandum which sets forth the position of the United States with respect to security in the region of Japan, there is mentioned "the joint responsibility of Japanese organs and of American, and possibly other troops, for the maintenance of international peace and security in the region of Japan".

In as much as in the memorandum is mentioned the above-indicated "joint responsibility" for the maintenance of international peace and security in the region of Japan, the Soviet Government desires to receive explanations on the following two questions:

Firstly, whether it is proposed, in connection with the above-mentioned "joint responsibility", to create Japanese armed forces, that is, a Japanese army, a Japanese navy and a Japanese air force, as well as the corresponding Japanese staffs.

Secondly, whether the above-mentioned "joint responsibility" means that even after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan American military, naval and air force bases will be maintained on the territory of Japan.

6. Nothing is said in the memorandum concerning the necessity of ensuring for the Japanese people an opportunity to develop freely its peacetime economy.

The Soviet Government desires to receive an explanation whether it is intended to include in the peace treaty provisions for the annulment of all limitations on the development of Japanese peacetime economy and for granting Japan access to the sources of raw materials, and also for Japan's participation in world trade with equal rights.

In as much as it is perfectly evident that in the matter of the peace treaty with Japan, China has a special interest, because China in particular was subjected for many years to aggression on the part of Japanese militarists, the Soviet Government desires to know what is being done to determine the point of view of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic on this matter.

It stands to reason that later it may be necessary to obtain explanations on other questions which may possibly arise, particularly after the position of other states with regard to the memorandum of the United States becomes known.

Letters of Credence

Costa Rica

The newly appointed Ambassador of Costa Rica, Señor Don J. Rafael Oreamuno, presented his credentials to the President on November 21. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 1170 of November 21.

Strengthening U.S. Position in Far East Through Processes of Consultation

by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup¹

The beginning of understanding of United States policy in the Far East is the realization that many of our friends out there are in trouble.

Who are our friends out there? The peoples of Asia.

What trouble are they in and what caused their trouble? Here the answer is not simple but complex. Since our policy is designed to help them out of their trouble, that policy is necessarily also complex.

Some of the trouble comes from natural causes—famine, disease, poverty. Some is man-made—civil war, foreign subversion, open aggressive attack. Some people suffer from their own errors or their own ignorance; some from the errors or willfulness of their leaders; some from the mistakes or evil designs of people far away.

To meet the trouble that comes from natural causes, our policy includes economic and financial assistance, the Point 4 Program, and the United Nations Technical Assistance Program with which it is allied. We have not proceeded blindly but on the basis of careful investigation and experimentation. The Griffin Mission surveyed the needs of Southeast Asia, and we are acting on the basis of its report. The Bell Mission reported on the Philippines. As a result, Mr. Foster, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, as a special representative of the President, has recently concluded an agreement with that country which is one of our closest friends in the area. The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction established by the Economic Cooperation Administration carried on notable work on the Chinese mainland until the Communists came and prevented this practical demonstration of the kind of help we are able and ready to give the farmers. The Commission is continuing its work on Formosa. In Korea, despite the continuation of Communist-supported hostilities, the United Na-

tions program of reconstruction in which we participate as part of our policy, is moving ahead. These are samples only of what we have done and what we are doing or are ready to do.

To meet the man-made troubles, we are giving military assistance where it is required and desired. In Korea especially we support the United Nations action to repel aggression and restore peace.

Our record is clean, honorable, and we point to it with pride. We have not eliminated poverty, hunger, and disease. True. We have not converted the minds of all men to the ways of peace and the other principles of the Charter of the United Nations. True. These facts do not indicate the failure of our policy. We are contending with great forces of natural and human evil. Those forces will probably not be wholly subdued in our lifetime. For that reason, we follow our policy; we do not abandon it.

Lines of Criticism Discussed

Under the present organization of our Government, foreign policy of the United States is made by the President. The President has as his principal responsible adviser in foreign policy the Secretary of State. The President acts also, however, on the advice of the National Security Council, of which he is Chairman and of which the Secretary of State as well as the Secretary of Defense and other high officers of the Government are members. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are equally represented in the National Security Council.

Our foreign policy is not the property of any political party. There is no distinction of parties in the personnel which shapes our policy in the Department of State. Republicans and Democrats alike in both Houses of the Congress join in the consideration of and in the support of policy. On our present delegation to the United Nations

¹ Excerpts from an address delivered before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council at Philadelphia, Pa., on Nov. 24 and released to the press on the same date.

General Assembly, Senators Austin, Lodge, Dulles, and Cooper are Republicans.

There is also the principle of responsibility which is inherent in our representative form of government. The Administration bears the responsibility and must, in case of disagreement, make the decisions. It decides, after taking advice, what it considers to be wise and in the interest of the United States.

When there is trouble in the world and particularly when that trouble amounts to war or the threat of war on any far horizon, opponents of the Administration in power are always loud in their criticism. It is always easy to say that, if there had been some other Administration and some other policy, the trouble would not exist. In all periods of our history, we have seen such waves of criticism.

Criticism is a normal and indeed a proper part of our democratic procedure. The right to criticize, while not specified in the Constitution, is not unrelated to the Constitutional right to petition the Government. Storms of criticism swept over the heads of Washington and of Lincoln. Violent outbursts attacked the McKinley Administration during the period in which we sought to establish peace and order in the Philippines after the close of the Spanish-American War. That, too, was a period of guerrilla warfare and of nationalist aspirations in the Far East—aspirations, be it noted, which have now been realized as a result of United States foreign policy. The Wilson Administration was roundly denounced for not getting us into war and for getting us into war. It was equally denounced for the great vision embodied in the peace which included the Covenant of the League of Nations. President Roosevelt did not escape waves of criticism after Hitler began to stir his cauldron of aggression.

Some types of criticism which recur in our history and are voiced today would imply that it is the United States which made and makes the policies adopted in Berlin or Moscow or other centers of aggression. Some seem to suggest that the United States is responsible for the evil which breeds in the minds of power-hungry men in other lands. Actually we know that this is not true.

We are not responsible for the existence of evil. We are required by the existence of evil to strive for the ultimate triumph of the good.

It is easy to get into war as long as the spirit of aggression and subversion is at large in the world. It is always difficult to keep the peace. There is no question that the preference of the American people is for peace. There is no question that the policy of the United States in the Far East, as in all other parts of the world, is devoted to an attempt to maintain the peace.

The maintenance of peace is not always possible, but the effort to maintain the peace is always the first duty of those in charge of the foreign policy of the United States.

We reject appeasement of aggressors as an in-

strument for maintaining the peace. We reject equally the theory that we will maintain peace alone, by our own dictate. We reject the theory of the preventive war.

As the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have repeatedly explained in recent statements to the American people and to the world, we are committed to the proposition that we must build the strength of the free world so that we will maintain a position in which we can prove that aggression is a disastrous adventure.

Peaceful Processes of Negotiation

At the same time, we have repeatedly stated that we are always ready to negotiate. Negotiation in broad terms includes all the peaceful processes which we are solemnly bound by the Charter of the United Nations to utilize. Those who deny the propriety of negotiation, of peaceful processes, must offer an alternative. If it is to be an acceptable alternative, it must be one consistent with our obligations under the Charter. The Charter is not an unrealistic document. It recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense. It sanctions such regional agreements as the Rio pact and the North Atlantic Treaty. It provides for collective action against aggression, such as that which the United Nations is now carrying on in Korea with the support of 53 of its members.

How simple—and how utterly misleading—it is to draw analogies between the lives of individuals and lives of nations. As individuals, we do not choose to sit around the same table with people who have broken their promises and who are plotting crimes—so the story goes. Why then, we are asked, will we sit around a table and negotiate with the representatives of a regime which violates its treaties and plots and instigates aggression? If we must have an analogy to the actions of individuals, let us recall that a District Attorney, who represents law and justice, may properly talk with the attorney of a criminal at the bar.

But instead of worrying with analogies, it is better to face the realities of international life. In time of war, we have many times negotiated with our bitterest enemies on such matters as exchange of prisoners of war, truces, and, finally, the terms of peace. In time of peace, we must choose between isolation and dealing with the other governments which make up the world. In the United Nations, we must deal with all other members of the organization or boycott it. We condemn such boycotts and will not engage in them.

More than this, we can never escape the hard fact that it is most particularly with those who are the enemies of peace that we must discuss and explore every possibility of peace. We have much less need to negotiate with our friends than with our enemies.

Critics of the United States policy in the Far East sneer at our repeated assurances that we are and will remain the friends of the Chinese people. In fact, we are the friends of the Chinese people and we will continue to remind them of the fact. We do not accept the theory which is behind the arguments now currently being made that once a Communist dictatorship has established itself over a people which it momentarily enslaves, we should abandon those people to their fate. We do not believe that, under such circumstances, we should leave to those people only the choice between acceptance of enslavement or annihilation in war. We hold out to them the prospect of a peaceful world organized through the United Nations in which peoples can live together in friendship.

In some of the now rampant irresponsible criticism of United States foreign policy in the Far East, there is an attempt to undermine confidence in our country and to spread fear. The American people are urged to think that we cannot stand up in the world we live in, that we are not strong enough to have our way of life prevail. What do these prophets of doom urge as a foreign policy of the United States? Only some have the courage, or the stupidity, to advocate outright the only choice that can be made if one starts from their premise. Their choice is to start dropping atomic bombs—their choice is war.

The Government of the United States has no such mandate from the American people. The vast majority of the American people have faith in our system, in our ideals, in our way of life. They know that life is not easy in its individual or in its national aspects. But they hold their heads high and look the world in the face. They know that the forces of peace and justice and decency have always been opposed by the forces of aggression and evil. They are ready to fight if that is necessary, but they do not admit there is never any other way. It is because this is true and because most of the world knows it is true that the United States is a leader through trust and respect. Most of the world trusts our purposes; they respect our strength and rely on it.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, can only rule its satellites by fear. We do not choose to follow the Soviet way.

It is going to be necessary for us to make sacrifices, to expend great effort to fulfill the responsibility of world leadership. We will, however, lead and not drive. We will lead in a cooperative effort which blends the efforts of the free world. No slave system can have equal power. This is the reason we as a people reject the timidous counsels of those who cry that we must choose war as a national policy. It is because we reject the war policy that we have with us the strength of a united free world.

On Memorial Day of this year General Marshall spoke at Arlington. It is well to keep in mind what this great American soldier-statesman said:

. . . there is nothing to be said in favor of war except that it is the lesser of two evils. For it is better than appeasement of aggression because appeasement encourages the very aggression it seeks to prevent. And it is far better than submission to tyranny and oppression, because without freedom and respect for human dignity life would not be worth living.

Unless we are faced with the choice of these terrible alternatives, I think we should concentrate on finding peaceful solutions to the world's problems. Peace should be a dynamic force and not a negative condition that is merely the absence of armed hostilities. We should support to the full every existing instrument to the building of a more stable world.

. . . We have before us the greatest task ever faced by any generation of men in the fight to preserve peace. War, I say again, is no longer just an evil. In this age it seems intolerable.

Response to Korean Aggression

We responded, as we were bound to do in accordance with our obligations under the Charter, to the violent and unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea which began on the 25th of June. It is perfectly clear that nothing would give more satisfaction to those directing the strategy of Communist imperialism than to see the United States entangled in full-scale war on the mainland of Asia. There are thoughtless people in this country who would have us fall into this trap. The Soviet propaganda line, which is parroted by the Chinese Communist regime in Peiping, tries to persuade the people of Asia that we are bent on the invasion and conquest of Manchuria. It has long been obvious and it has frequently been pointed out that the usual technique of the Moscow propagandists is to accuse others of what they themselves are doing or are about to do. Actually, the policy of the United States is as stated by President Truman on November 16th when he pointed out,

. . . that it is the intention of the United Nations to localize the conflict and withdraw its forces from Korea as soon as the situation permits. Speaking for the United States Government and people, I can give assurance that we support and are acting within the limits of United Nations policy in Korea, and that we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China. So far as the United States is concerned, I wish to state unequivocally that because of our deep devotion to the cause of world peace and our long-standing friendship for the people of China we will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East.

This clear, unequivocal, and authoritative statement of American policy has been brought to the knowledge of all the peoples of Asia that we can reach by every means at our command. We must recognize, however, that conflicting statements from certain American sources indicating a contrary intention are widely distributed through the Communist propaganda. Even if these propaganda channels are not fully believed, they tend to cause doubt in the minds of these Asiatic peoples about the sincerity of the policy of the United States as declared by the President. Those in the United States who write or speak in such a way

as to provide ammunition for this Communist propaganda must bear the responsibility for thus contributing to our enemies' attempt to undermine confidence in the United States and its Government.

Russian Imperialistic Designs in Asia

In considering American foreign policy in the Far East, it is all too easy to concentrate upon the headline news of the moment. This is a temptation which those in charge of framing and executing foreign policy must constantly avoid.

American foreign policy in the Far East has its roots deep in history. Many of the facts and circumstances which we are considering today are merely new manifestations of old problems with which the United States has contended for well over 50 years. We are faced today, as we have always been faced, with the imperialistic designs of Russia in Asia.

Both under the czars and under the present Bolshevik imperialists, Russia has sought to extend her control over Asia. This policy has been pursued always at the expense of China. Since the Bolsheviks took control of this old Russian imperialistic policy, they have tightened their grip on Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang—all at the expense of China. This is an example of what President Truman has called "the new colonialism—Soviet style." The consistent policy of the United States over all these decades has been to protect China against the imperialism of Russia and, at times, of other powers. We have never deviated from that fundamental policy which is associated in American thinking with the famous doctrine of the Open Door.

We have not pursued this policy because we were rivals for the domination of Asia. In Asia, as elsewhere, we have pursued a policy based on our conviction that friendly cooperation and equal opportunity result in benefits to all peoples concerned. We do not accept the Russian theory that our national interests can be served only by getting special privileges or by subjecting Asiatic people to our control.

In the General Assembly of the United Nations, last year, the United States joined with four other delegations in sponsoring a resolution which carried forward the historic policy of protecting the political independence and territorial integrity of China. No delegation in the United Nations voted against this resolution except the delegation of the Soviet Union and those delegations which always take their orders from Moscow. We needed no such additional proof of the continuation of Russian imperialism in Asia at the expense of China; but if others needed it, the speeches and votes of the Soviet and satellite delegations in the United Nations gave it to them. Here, was a clear statement that the Russians would not join with the rest of the world in a guaranty to respect the integrity of China. Perhaps, the only

surprising thing was that, in this instance, they allowed their words to coincide so frankly with their actions.

The United States is now engaged with 52 other members of the United Nations in repulsing the Communist aggression upon another independent Asiatic state—Korea. From 1941 to 1945, we were equally engaged with the Allies, who took the name of "United Nations" less than a month after Pearl Harbor, in defeating the Japanese aggression. The Soviet Union was then one of those Allies. The recent propaganda of the Soviet Union has attempted to indicate that they played a very great part in the liberation of the peoples of Asia from Japanese imperialism.

But the recorded views of the Soviet Union give the lie to this propaganda. In a note to the United States Government on February 20, 1947, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that—

the Soviet Government takes into account that the armed might of the U.S.A. played the decisive role in the matter of victory over Japan and that, in the war with Japan, the U.S.A. bore incomparably greater sacrifices than the other allied governments.

There can be no comparison, of course, between the gigantic war effort waged by the United States and its Allies to bring about the defeat of Japan in World War II and the military effort made by the U.S.S.R. toward that common objective. It will be recalled that the Soviet Union did not enter the Pacific War before August 8, 1945. The Soviet forces, thus, were committed for a period of only 6 days before Japan accepted the Allies' surrender terms on August 14. Contrasted to this 6-day period, United States forces fought their bitter and difficult war with Japan for 3 years and 8 months and, at the end of the war, had a force of over 3,600,000 fighting men arrayed against the Japanese army and navy in the Pacific.

Moreover, the Soviet declaration of war came 2 days after the Japanese militarists had been brought to their knees—their main island devastated by United States bombers; their navy, once the third largest in the world, virtually destroyed; their prewar merchant marine of some 6 million tons largely sunk; and its planes driven from the skies.

The Japanese people, by the defeat of the policy of their militarists, were, like other peoples of Asia, liberated by the overwhelming power of the United States. Under the brilliant administration of General MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Japanese people are now ready to resume their place in the international society as a democratic and peace-loving people. Their traditional system under their new constitution has been molded into an instrument to guide them in this new phase of their national existence.

The latest indication of the Russian attitude toward this reestablishment of Japan is found in their recent demand that the Emperor should now

be tried as a war criminal. This demand, coming as it did 4½ years after the surrender and many months after the war criminal trials in Japan had been terminated, strongly suggests that the principal motivation was to divert attention from Soviet failure to repatriate or otherwise explain the fate of over 370,000 Japanese prisoners who fell under Soviet control when hostilities ended in August 1945. So far as the trial of the Emperor is concerned, that is a question which lies within the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Commission which, in 1946, decided that the Emperor should not be indicted as a war criminal without its direct authorization.

The time has come to end the attitudes which existed in time of war. General MacArthur has announced that Japan is ready for a peace treaty. We are proceeding with negotiations looking toward such a peace treaty which will enable the new Japan to take its place as a member of the United Nations and thus to participate as a peace-loving member in the life of the international community.

Korea was also liberated by our victory in World War II. Its new liberation from Communist aggression involves different circumstances and different problems. However, again, the United States has taken the lead in following the inevitable destruction of war with the peaceful process of reconstruction. In agreement with the suggestions made by Secretary of State Acheson in his opening address to the General Assembly this year, the United Nations has taken steps to assist the new United Korea to rebuild on sure foundations.

I have been speaking of some of the man-made difficulties which American foreign policy has countered in the Far East. These are only examples, but I shall not repeat now the full list of cases in which we are giving appropriate assistance to governments in the Far East to maintain themselves against external attack or internal subversion.

The United States supports the nationalist aspirations of those peoples who are progressively advancing toward the United Nations Charter's goal of self-government or independence. It is the policy of our Government to use the full measure of its influence to support the attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it. We are convinced that it is in the best interests of all concerned that a transfer of authority to such peoples be consummated quickly and generously. We appreciate the advantages flowing from a transfer which is based upon mutual accommodation. We recognize the far-sighted statesmanship of those who transfer authority and the sense of deep responsibility with which those who take authority assume the burdens of government. Once won, however, political freedom must be preserved. It must be preserved not only against attack from without but also from those who would betray that independence from within. We shall strive

unremittingly through the United Nations and in association with free peoples, whether they be in Europe or in Asia, to see to it that freedom is preserved.

Support of Land Reform Programs

Let me return now to one of the difficulties which has long affected peoples of Asia and which is partly natural and partly man-made. I refer to the problem of land. I have mentioned briefly some of the things which we have done in meeting the problems of tenancy, of land distribution, and of the use of the land in Asia. In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 17th of October, President Truman emphasized our understanding of this problem and our desire to help. As the Congress of Industrial Organizations stated in a resolution adopted a few days ago, "We must prove to the people of the world that in a democratic society men can have both bread and freedom." Secretary Acheson and Secretary of Agriculture Brannan have recently pointed out the great achievement of the land reform program in Japan under the military occupation. The result is that 3 million Japanese farmers have acquired land, and about 90 percent of all the cultivators of land in Japan are now owners. They have pointed out also the progress which was made toward land reform in Korea while we were still in military occupation. The Korean Government continued that program and had plans scheduled for last summer—before the Communist invasion—which would have made farm owners 90 percent of the Korean farm families.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has recently adopted a resolution calling for a study of this problem of land reform and for suggestions on how best to meet it. In supporting this resolution in the General Assembly, Senator Sparkman, speaking for the United States delegation, pointed out that the program of individual farm ownership is one to which we are devoted in this country and which we think may well be undertaken in many parts of the world.

The peoples of Asia are beginning to realize the difference between these democratic land reforms and the Communist fraud which, as Secretary Brannan has said, "consists of transferring land from feudal landlords to a feudal government."

Processes of Consultation Inherent in Democratic Leadership

In closing let me say that I believe that we all are glad that isolation is dead. The isolation which is dead is the policy of deliberately choosing to act as if we could hold ourselves aloof from the world and ignore what is going on around us. That isolation has been killed by the American

people who have accepted the policy of supporting the United Nations.

But we are not free from the danger of a more insidious isolation. This isolation would not be the result of a deliberate choice but would be the inevitable consequence of misguided policies. We could be isolated from friendly nations by a dictatorial insistence upon policies formulated by us unilaterally instead of through the normal processes of consultation which are inherent in democratic leadership. Policies currently urged by some of those who criticize American foreign policy might well bring us to that kind of isolation.

Actually, what do we see? In this hemisphere, our relations with the other 20 American Republics of South America are on a sure and firm foundation of friendly collaboration. We continue to enjoy our intimate association with our great neighbor to the north. In the North Atlantic community, a new solidarity and spirit of cooperation have developed and the nations of this area are uniting in a plan for common defense against aggression. Through the Middle East and on into Asia, it is now understood that the United States is not a self-seeking imperialist country which wishes to impose its will upon other peoples. They have heard President Truman's appeal for a "partnership of peace." In the action to defeat aggression in Korea, 52 other nations of the United Nations stand with us. The Acheson Plan for Uniting for Peace has been adopted by the General Assembly with only the Soviet bloc dissenting.

Here, is the demonstration of the success of American policy. American policy stands on the solid rock of international cooperation. It has rejected the old voluntary isolation and escapes the danger of an involuntary isolation. On that rock, we stand and we will continue to stand.

Resolution on Land Reform

U.N. doc. A/154R
Adopted Nov. 20, 1950

The General Assembly,

BEARING IN MIND the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and by the Economic and Social Council¹ concerning the economic development of underdeveloped countries in which industrialization as well as the development of agriculture must play an essential part,

CONSIDERING, however, that agrarian conditions which persist in many underdeveloped countries and territories constitute a barrier to their economic development because such conditions are a major cause of low agricultural productivity and of low standards of living for the populations of those countries and territories,

CONVINCED that immediate steps should be taken to study the extent to which existing agrarian conditions hamper the economic development of under-developed countries as well as to assist Governments at their request,

in the utilization of the facilities available in the United Nations and the specialized agencies for the improvement of such conditions,

1. *Recommends* that the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Food and Agriculture Organization and in consultation with other appropriate specialized agencies, prepare and submit to the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council an analysis of the degree to which unsatisfactory forms of agrarian structure and, in particular, systems of land tenure, in the under-developed countries and territories impede economic development and thus depress the standards of living especially of agricultural workers and tenants and of small and medium-sized farmers;

2. *Calls upon* the Economic and Social Council to consider the analysis referred to above and to prepare recommendations to the General Assembly with a view to the improvement of the conditions of agricultural populations, paying special attention to such measures as the following:

(a) Institution of appropriate land reform;

(b) Appropriate action on the part of the Governments concerned to render financial aid to agricultural workers and tenants and to small and medium-sized farmers through cheap agricultural credit facilities, comprehensive technical assistance and the promotion of rural co-operatives;

(c) Construction or development, either by direct Government action or suitably financed co-operative groups, of

(i) Small factories and workshops for the manufacture, maintenance, repair and servicing of the most essential agricultural machinery and for the storage of spare parts;

(ii) Locally-based enterprises for the processing of agricultural products;

(d) Taxation policies designed to lighten, to the greatest possible extent, the tax burden on tenants and small and medium-sized farmers;

(e) Promotion of family owned and operated farms and of co-operative farms, as well as of other measures to promote the security of tenure and the welfare of agricultural workers and tenants and of small and medium-sized farmers;

3. *Recommends* to the Governments of the under-developed countries concerned that they avail themselves of the facilities available to them through the United Nations expanded programme of technical assistance, in order that they may obtain expert advice in the planning of such measures as those listed in the preceding paragraph, for the purpose of improving agrarian conditions.

¹ For example, General Assembly resolutions 45 (I) and 52 (I), 198 (III), 200 (III), 202 (III), 209 (III), 304 (IV), 305 (IV), 306 (IV), 307 (IV) and 331 (IV), and Economic and Social Council resolutions adopted at the first and second sessions on the terms of reference of the Economic and Employment Commission and resolutions 1 (III), 6 (III), 26 (IV), 27 (IV), 29 (IV), 32 (IV), 36 (IV), 37 (IV), 51 (IV), 103 (VI), 106 (VI), 109 (VI), 139 (VII), 140 (VII), 179 (VIII), 180 (VIII), 184 (VIII), 222 (IX), 223 (IX), 225 (IX), 268 (X), 294 (XI), 297 (XI) and 321 (XI).

Security Problems in Far East Areas

*Extemporaneous Remarks by Dean Rusk
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹*

Korea

First, let's look at the most pressing and important one, that is, Korea. To understand the problem in Korea, I think we have to stop a moment to see where we are and then try to see where we go.

The present phase of the Korean problem started with the north Korean aggression across the 38th parallel back in June. You are familiar with the events of that important week end when it was decided by the United Nations, with the full concurrence of the United States, to resist that aggression. We have been acting for sometime under a Security Council resolution of June 27, which called upon the members of the United Nations to act to repel the aggressor and to restore international peace and security in the area of Korea.

MILITARY OPERATIONS NEARING END

I suppose it is fair to say that the original problem has been to a considerable extent dealt with insofar as actual aggression is concerned. The north Korean forces were generally destroyed. They have been dispersed, and the north Koreans themselves do not provide a substantial military problem. We have something on the order of 150,000 north Korean prisoners. We were well on the way to winding up that situation. What we had not been able to do was to complete the job of restoring international peace and security in the area of Korea. The military operation was in its closing phases.

The United Nations General Assembly took up the question of Korea and passed a resolution in October which set a political program for the establishment of stability in Korea; that political program was based upon a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. You are familiar with that resolution, but let me just remind you that it provides for a United Nations Commission to go into

Korea to take the necessary political steps in north Korea as well as in south Korea to bring about a unified country which would then be supported by a United Nations program, both in the political field and in the relief and rehabilitation field.

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

That program, on the basis of which we have been operating, has been seriously interfered with by a new element. That is Chinese Communist intervention. That intervention creates a new and extremely dangerous and delicate situation.

First, about the facts of the intervention: I think it would be a mistake for us to assume that outside intervention in favor of north Korea has been a recent event. There is reason to believe that that intervention has had its roots deeply in the past in the north Korean problem. Among the 150,000 prisoners taken away from the north Korean Army, for example, there are a considerable number who have had experience in the Chinese Communist Army.

There is reason to suppose that they have been moving or they had been moving into Korea for a considerable period before the aggression started in late June. Some of them may even have come in as units and called themselves north Korean units. Many of those, undoubtedly, were of Korean ethnic origin, but I don't think we should assume that it is all right for countries to let residents of a foreign ethnic origin move to a neighboring country to take part in acts of aggression or illegal penetration through military means.

In any event, it was perfectly clear that from the time the aggression started the north Koreans were receiving support not only from Soviet sources but also from the Chinese Communists. This consisted of political support in terms of an attempt to mobilize Asiatic opinion behind the north Koreans and attempts to confuse the free world in its effort to meet that aggression. It also consisted of line of communication support, sup-

¹ Made before a National Conference on Foreign Policy held at Washington on Nov. 15 and released to the press on the same date.

ply, and other types of support of direct military significance. So that, when we say Chinese Communists are now intervening in Korea, we may be talking about a change in scale, a change in shape, perhaps a change in purpose, but we are not talking about an intervention which is coming just at this time, solely for immediate reasons, unconnected with past events.

DANGERS FACING U.N. FORCES

Chinese intervention now is substantial. There appears to be a large and organized ground force now in Korea backed up by very substantial reserves across the Yalu River. The north Korean Chinese forces in Korea are receiving air support from aircraft daily crossing the frontier from Manchurian bases. Senator Austin, in the Security Council the other day, pointed to the very difficult problem posed by what General MacArthur called "the privileged sanctuary of the Manchurian frontier."

We ought to consider that for a moment because it does present us with a very dangerous and difficult problem. Enemy forces can be supplied in the course of 1 night from across the Yalu River. Reserves can move under cover of darkness in 1 night's march to the front line from underneath this bombproof shelter of Manchurian territory. That means that, insofar as air can interfere with movement of enemy personnel to the front, our force is very seriously handicapped because it is restricted to a line of communication about 50 miles, stretching from present front lines back to the Yalu River. That, of course, imposes a severe limit upon the ability of United Nations air forces to support the operations of United Nations ground forces. Similarly, and perhaps in an even more important way, that sanctuary presents a problem for our air forces. During the past week, we have lost several B-29's to enemy jet fighters which have cruised along on the other side of the Yalu River. They suddenly make a dash for United Nations planes operating on the Korean side of the Yalu River, make their strike, and, before United Nations planes which are screening on the Korean side of the Yalu can get to them, they have scooted off again back to the safe haven of Manchurian territory.

You can understand that it takes a considerable degree of restraint on the part of our armed forces to accept that situation. It imposes a very considerable strain not only upon the military result but also upon the morale of the forces involved. On the other hand, it is not easy to decide that you should extend hostilities across the Yalu because the whole purpose of the United Nations and the United States from the very beginning has been to localize this conflict in Korea, not to permit it to spread, to bring peace to Korea itself, and not let general hostilities develop out of this situation.

Why this new phase in Chinese intervention? May I say that we do not know what Chinese

intentions are, and when I say that I do not mean to imply that we do not have a good many ideas. But we do not know, in the sense in which you have to know, if you are a government, as a basis for action which you yourself might have to take. In other words, not to know may mean that you are not certain. I suggest that it does not always mean that you are simply ignorant.

EXPLAINING THE NEW PHASE

Let me run over briefly some of the possible explanations for this new phase of Chinese intervention which have been discussed publicly and which, I think, ought to be summarized here for your consideration.

It is of the greatest importance that we try to find out for certain whether the Chinese have limited objectives in this present situation which are negotiable in character, or whether they have unlimited objectives which are not negotiable in character.

It is also suggested that another critical question is when the Chinese decided to go into Korea. Another critical question behind that is who decided that the Chinese would go into Korea.

Now, those are not easy to answer, but I suggest again that it may be quite wrong to suppose that what the Chinese are now doing is a result of most recent events in Korea, such as crossing the 38th parallel, for example, by United Nations forces. I think it would be wrong to make that assumption.

The Chinese let it be publicly known some weeks ago that they would not stand idly by if United Nations forces moved into north Korea. It may be that what they are now doing in Korea is not standing idly by and that it is, in a sense, backing up their statements in order that they not be caught bluffing.

It may be that they feel an obligation to the north Koreans to make some show of additional support.

It may be that they have been under considerable pressure from the Soviet Union to offer assistance and that there is a token effort for the benefit both of the north Koreans and of the U.S.S.R.

It may be that they are interested in hydroelectric power being supplied to Manchuria by hydroelectric installations along the Yalu. If their purpose is to protect that power, the question arises as to how they would expect to protect it by sending troops into north Korea to occupy power installations, because that obviously is not a way in which you can secure hydroelectric installations which are vulnerable from the air. But, nevertheless, it is true that those power installations do supply a significant amount of electric power to Manchuria and that we might expect them to be sensitive to that point.

It has been suggested that this represents a classical case of a screen of foreign intervention and

foreign adventure for internal troubles. It is not easy to build evidence upon a point of that sort but, nevertheless, we need not brush aside as ancient a possibility as that one always is.

Then, I think, we might consider that there may be some fear in China that United Nations forces would not stop at the Yalu River. It may be that the Chinese are not sufficiently confident that the United Nations, as an organization, means what it says on a matter of that sort.

It may be that when the Chinese Communists said the other day that Manchuria is the teeth and Korea, the lips and that, if the lips are lost, the teeth become cold that that represented a genuine anxiety on their part that United Nations forces along the Yalu River would constitute a direct threat to Manchuria.

I suggest, if you want to follow that point a little further, that you might put yourself in Peiping, consider that you have been subjected to a barrage of Soviet propaganda over a period of time, look at the international policy propaganda line assumed by the Communists over the period of the last year or two, and look out across China and the Pacific and see whether or not you might yourself actually have some such misgivings. I am not suggesting that they would be misgivings in good faith, but that, if conduct on the part of the Communists themselves can be expected to bring about reaction in the rest of the world, at least, they would be fearful of that reaction.

There has been some talk about a buffer zone. That perhaps they are trying to create in north Korea a buffer zone between themselves and United Nations forces. That is a matter which has come up for some discussion publicly around Lake Success and is a matter about which, undoubtedly, there will be more discussion in the future.

It is entirely possible that what the Chinese really have in mind is a political reentry into north Korea. Had the United Nations forces stopped at the 38th parallel and permitted the north Korean forces to organize a Communist North Korea on the same basis on which they had it organized before June, then the way might have been left open to them to try again at a later date, perhaps not by military means but by political means, to do what they had not been able to do by military means in the aggression. In other words, to supply a platform so that in the longer run they will be in a position to take politically what they have not been able to take militarily.

Up to this point, we have been talking about reasonably limited military objectives. It is always necessary to add to the list such questions as whether this intervention in Korea is a part of a general pattern of Communist activity in the Far East. Is it connected with Indochina? Is it connected with Tibet? Is it connected with the Communist guerrilla bands in Malaya, or with the increase in Huk activity in the Philippines? Is this an over-all or at least regional pattern in

the Communist plan at this stage? And, of course, the most serious of all questions—is this activity in Korea to be associated with world-wide plans for additional pressures and aggressiveness of any sort?

I think you would like to know which ones of those explain Chinese action in this present situation. So would we. Those are only a few of the possibilities. I think we will probably discover that a considerable combination of these elements may be involved. But the critical question is whether Peiping's purpose is compatible with the action of the United Nations in Korea.

Is it to demilitarize the frontier so that there is no threat across the Yalu River? If so, the United Nations can work that out. Is it to insure an equitable distribution of hydroelectric power? If so, the United Nations can work that out.

But, if it is to plot the eventual seizure of all Korea—the United Nations can't work that out. If it is a part of a general program of aggression, the United Nations will not accept it.

The United Nations has tried to reassure the other side that if its purposes are compatible with the United Nations purposes and are negotiable, the other side need not worry. I think it is necessary for the United Nations also to point out, however, that that does not mean appeasement or submission to purposes which are not compatible with United Nations policy and program for Korea.

In determining then what the United States attitude should be on this extremely difficult question, I should just like to say that we must be careful about too quick conclusions and too simplified an answer in a situation of this sort. You can turn a crank and produce a simple solution at almost any time. But that may not be the way to accomplish United Nations policy or to deal with the basic interests of the United States in this present situation.

I think that firmness, steady nerves, and determination—but with a determination also to operate within the framework of United Nations policy and to insure that the other side knows that we are operating within the framework of United Nations policy—is very important to our present attitude.

The situation on the ground will undoubtedly be clarified further during the course of the next 2 or 3 weeks, and I suppose that the political situation will be considerably clarified also in the course of that same period. We may know more about it then than we do now. I think that in that period some caution, some self-restraint is indicated.

Formosa

Turning from Korea, just for a moment, to another security question, which is somewhat related to it, I should like to discuss briefly the question of Formosa.

On the week end of June 25-27, we were con-

fronted with the fact that international communism had apparently decided to resort to formal all-out armed aggression posing some extremely difficult questions. One of them was what else do these people have in mind? Are we going to be involved in a general crisis throughout the Far East, or indeed on a world basis, or is this Korean action itself a limited action?

In order to insure that United Nations forces operating in Korea would not be heavily threatened from an important flank position and in order that in that period of crisis there would not be a sudden shift in the military position of Formosa, the President ordered the Seventh Fleet to insure the military neutralization of that island and to protect the flank of United States forces in Korea.

Now, the question is what do we do about the future of Formosa? There are two elementary points in the American position at this point with respect to Formosa.

One is that it should be militarily neutralized while the Korean action is in progress. We do not believe that it will be tolerable to have Formosa seized and exploited militarily by those acting contrary to the policies and programs of the United Nations. Thus, military neutralization is an important element in the present situation.

The second is that whatever people think about Formosa, and people think a great many different things about Formosa, it must be settled by peaceful means. We should not allow Formosa itself to become a point around which a general war could start or that Formosa should threaten the general peace and security of the Pacific area.

Therefore, we asked that Formosa be considered by the General Assembly. We think it important that the United Nations move in to insure that Formosa be settled by peaceful means.

COMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

It would be normal for the United Nations to arrange for a Commission to take a look at it and to report back to the United Nations at a later date. Formosa is complicated in its history. It is complicated in the international commitments made with respect to it. It is complicated by the fact that there are two Chinese claimants. It is complicated by the fact that the members of the international community are seriously divided among themselves in terms of recognizing one or the other Chinese claimant or recognizing the claims of either to the Island of Formosa. It is complicated further because there has been no clear, no real consultation with the Formosans themselves either during or since this past war.

Thus, we hope very much that the United Nations will take this matter up and put it into the category of those questions which are being dealt with by peaceful means. We hope also that the other side will see fit to accept that procedure and not press it on a basis of military action.

Japan

In the same area, we have a very large problem in the future of Japan. We were very much encouraged by the behavior of the Japanese in the face of this aggression in Korea. They remained calm, friendly, sympathetic. They clearly supported the action of the United Nations in Korea. They are supporting not only politically through statements made by the cabinet but also in a very tangible sense by line-of-communication support inside Japan itself, by the use of facilities, port installations, labor, things of that sort.

NEED FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT

We think it would be a great pity if we should not now move rapidly toward a Japanese peace settlement and give Japan a chance to come back into the community of nations as a free and equal member. The fact that Japan does not already have a peace settlement is not Japan's fault. I think it is fair to say that Japan has substantially complied with the conditions set for Japan in the terms of surrender.

The absence of a peace settlement is due to differences among the great powers and not to failure on the part of Japan to comply with her obligations. The Japanese, themselves, have been, for the past year particularly, discussing the problem of a peace settlement very actively. There is no question but that Japanese opinion is ripe for a peace settlement, and, if a peace settlement is not soon forthcoming, there will likely be a revulsion in Japanese opinion and political problems of the greatest order would be created in that part of the Pacific.

In bringing about a Japanese peace settlement, there will be two important security questions which will have to be considered. One of them is Japan's security against attack. The other is the security of other countries in the Pacific against a possible revival of Japanese militarism.

In terms of imminence and present importance, the first question, of course, is more pressing. Japan, in its Constitution, has renounced war and has renounced the maintenance of armed forces in the ordinary sense. Obviously, they have not renounced an inherent right of self-defense. So, we are going to be confronted with the problem of how we arrange for the security of Japan in a post-treaty world. Will it mean commitments by the United States? Will it mean international commitments of a collective security sort? Is that something which the United Nations will be able to do in due course? To what extent must the Japanese carry some of that burden themselves?

Those are all questions of very great importance to which, of course, all of us are addressing ourselves these days. The Japanese, themselves, appear to favor a collective arrangement of some sort. They have been attracted by the action of the United Nations in Korea. They seem to feel

that the participation by them in a United Nations system would bring them back as a free and equal member more easily and more readily than some other arrangement. But, when you begin to consider the establishment of a collective security system through the United Nations to take care of this problem, you run into problems of technique and organization and the veto, which are complicating factors.

To what extent should Japan strengthen its own police operations, its own police forces to assist in its own defense? On the longer run, the question arises, should they be permitted some degree of rearmament? Those are questions before us. It is hard to provide an answer, but there will be other countries in the Pacific who, remembering the years before 1945, would be worried about a substantial increase in Japanese armaments under present conditions; perhaps not worried about the immediate situation but, the possibilities for the future.

Security Problems In Southeast Asia

Will it be necessary to arrange for some security machinery which will give such countries as the Philippines, for example, Australia, as well as ourselves, if you like, assurance that reviving Japanese militarism would not produce fresh aggression in that area? Those, again, are extremely difficult questions on which I cannot pretend to furnish an answer, but to which you ought to be giving considerable thought.

I would like to call your attention to the general problem of security throughout Southeast Asia, the specific problems of the Philippines, Indochina, Indonesia, and Thailand.

There is a general problem of security throughout Southeast Asia which arises from a combination of weakness on the one side and of aggressiveness on the other. It is the weakness of the independent countries of Southeast Asia themselves and the aggressiveness of those who are trying to move in to capitalize on that weakness.

PRINCIPAL POINTS OF WEAKNESS

First, you are confronted with growing poverty of hundreds of millions of men and women whose energies are consumed by a desperate struggle for existence, a lack of capital, elementary means of communication, without sufficient tools, or homes, without equipment to transform natural resources to the services of mankind, without cheap sources of power, without the means to control floods and irrigate deserts and combat pestilence, lack of technical know-how, and no specialists to provide a basic life for large societies.

We cannot underestimate the seriousness of the problem of helping to provide the essential in-

stallations of ordinary life throughout Southeast Asia. I say "help to provide" because we cannot hope possibly to do it ourselves. At best, we can help only in certain key respects. But, here, you have vast countries with large populations whose governmental structure has been destroyed and who have not yet created a fully working organism to take the place of their early institutions, so that you get in one capital after another the problem that a government can adopt a policy or pass a law, and nothing happens because there is no machinery to give effect to it. It is easy to pass a tax law, but extremely difficult to collect the taxes. It is easy to know what to do about public health but very difficult to get anything done throughout the villages of the country to develop public health practices. The most elementary institutions of national life are lacking in one country after another, and that creates a situation of great weakness which can be exploited by the other side.

Then, you have new and unaccustomed responsibilities which have to be assumed by people for their own affairs. While granting the fullest credit for the remarkable effort which is being made by those who have created new nations in Southeast Asia, certain elements of weakness must be recognized. One is a lack of experience. Another is military weakness, exposing them to external attack and to internal subversion. There is an inheritance of suspicion of each other, of the foreigner, of anything that is new. But particularly suspicion of the white man and the West, remembered as foreign rule and usually seen in the big hotels and fine houses and not yet seen enough in the villages and paddy fields of Southeast Asia. Communist imperialist propaganda is persistent in its insidious barrage designed to confuse, to foster resentment, to wither the growth of stable governments, to set class against class, and race against race—whatever leads to weakness in the path of Communist ambition.

I think we ought not to blur the fact that there are certain important weaknesses in our own propaganda positions in that part of the world. One of them is that communism has not tried to sell communism in Southeast Asia. Rather, communism has appeared in the guise of Asiatics selling nationalism. That is a commodity for ready sale in that part of the world. Democracy, on the other hand, has too often appeared in terms of white men associated with earlier imperialist regimes, talking about the threat of communism. And, since communism is not always recognized in the area for what it actually is, our warnings sound fairly hypothetical in consequence.

Importance of U.S. Standard of Conduct

We are being watched by a jury of a billion people out in that part of the world. We are being watched by people who are trying to decide between ways of life, and our weaknesses will and are picked up by our enemies and exploited. Thus,

our own failures will be a source of concern and regret to our friends.

This imposes upon us an incredibly painful standard of conduct which it is difficult for us to achieve. In that sense, there are no domestic problems for the United States. Everything we do has a bearing upon the total effect of our policy in that part of the world.

I am thinking now about such things as the presumption of innocence being as strong in this country today as a great fundamental principle of democracy as it was a few years ago. I am thinking about the exchange of ideas. Do we really believe these days as much as we used to that truth should conflict with error in order that truth can be strong? Are we committed to that?

What about our civil liberties? Granted that we have a fantastically high performance in civil liberties in this country compared to the general world situation, we are expected to be perfect by so much of the world that any failure on our part is exaggerated in effect beyond our imagination.

Let me say that in our relations with the Far East the greatest load we have to bear is the minority problems which exist here in this country. I say that without any equivocation whatever. I am not referring now to the Negroes in the South only. I am referring to all minority problems throughout the country, because that beclouds the effect of our democratic presentation to Asia more than anything else, more than the propaganda of the enemy, I suspect. I mention those because, in this battle of ideas, it isn't going to be easy out in the Far East.

And, lastly, Southeast Asia is weak because it is subject to aggressiveness by the other side. In the case of Korea, flagrant aggression by organized armies, unleashed by international Communist conspiracy and in defiance of the basic world community, a total disregard for human life and the lot of the miserable peoples who are directly involved, an aggression also by the devious methods of stealth and penetration, an aggression, no less dangerous, and more difficult to meet in many, many ways than open attack.

U.S. Renews Protest to U.S.S.R. for Interfering in Austrian Affairs

[Released to the press simultaneously at Paris, London, and Washington November 23]

Following is the text of a note from the American Ambassador at Moscow to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., delivered on November 22, 1950, protesting Soviet interference with the actions of the Austrian Government.

The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and has the honor to invite the Ministry's attention to

questions which were raised in the Allied Council in Austria on November 10, 1950 re unjustified Soviet interference in the administration of Austrian law enforcement agencies since disturbances on October 4, 1950, which were the subject of his government's communication of November 10, 1950.¹ The Government of the United States has been informed that, contrary to established Four Power agreements and practices, the local Soviet authorities have endeavored arbitrarily to prevent the Austrian Government from implementing disciplinary measures against certain malfeasant police chiefs in the Soviet sectors of Vienna. Information available to this government reveals that, under the protection and orders of Soviet officials, suspended police chiefs have defied legal and constitutional authority of the Federal Police-President, and have forbidden their subordinates to communicate with the central Austrian authorities without their consent. The Soviet representative in the Vienna Inter-Allied Command has further aggravated this cleavage in the Austrian law enforcement organization by unilaterally ordering the Federal Police-President to withdraw administrative actions of any nature affecting police personnel in the Soviet Zone unless prior approval has been obtained from Soviet authorities. Without regard to the obligation for quadripartite agreement in matters affecting the Austrian police, the Soviet Commander unilaterally ordered the Austrian Government to quash criminal proceedings against certain Vienna police officers and others arising from their violation of Austrian laws during recent disorders in Vienna. Soviet orders further prohibit either criminal or disciplinary actions against any Austrian police officers in the Soviet Zone. Such orders not only constitute a violation of the Control Agreement, but a serious impairment of power of the federal police to discharge their duty of maintaining law and order.

The Federal Chancellor of Austria in letters of October 24 and 27 presented evidence to the Allied Council of the above illegal acts and clearly established that the Soviet occupation authorities intervened to prevent the exercise of the legal right of the Austrian Government to suspend the police chiefs of the second, fourth, twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-fifth bezirke of Vienna. The Chancellor's communication verified the report that the execution of instructions of the central police officials was made dependent upon their approval by the Soviet authorities.

The position adopted by the Soviet authorities fails to take into account the fact that the Allied Council has entrusted the Austrian Government with responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. Their actions likewise clearly contravened the provisions of Article 2 of the Control Agreement, which sets forth the conditions under

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 819.

which any one of the occupying authorities may act independently.

There is no evidence that the Austrian authorities in the administration of their police are or have at any time been unable to maintain law and order except to the extent they have been prevented from doing so by Soviet intervention.

When confronted with the Chancellor's charges in the Allied Council, the Soviet High Commissioner adopted the indefensible attitude that he was entitled under the Control Agreement to act on his own authority in questions concerning police in the Soviet sectors of Vienna. Despite the joint responsibility of the four High Commissioners for the conduct of occupation affairs, the legal basis of which was set forth in this Embassy's note of November 10, 1950, and despite a precedent of four years of discussion of Austrian police matters, the Soviet representative in the Allied Council declined either to deny the Austrian allegation or to present a satisfactory explanation to other members of the Council. Furthermore, the Soviet High Commissioner did not attempt to explain why he had failed to make use of the facilities established by Article 6 (B) of the Control Agreement in order to bring to the notice of the Allied Council his disapproval of administrative actions of the Austrian authorities, and thus to enable the Allied Council to take, if it thought necessary, the action foreseen by that article.

These matters, following upon the events communicated in the Embassy's note of November 10, 1950, are brought to the attention of the Government of the U.S.S.R. because of the grave consequences to our common objective in Austria if international agreements continue to be disregarded. In consequence, the Government of the United States is obligated to renew most vigorously its protest against the actions of the Soviet occupation authorities and particularly against their usurpation of the clearly defined powers of the Allied Council. The Government of the United States once again requests the Soviet Government to issue appropriate instructions to its authorities in Austria to conform strictly to the solemn obligations entered into by the Four Powers, with a view to avoiding a serious deterioration of functioning of the quadripartite machinery in Austria.

U.S., U.K., and France Relax Travel Restrictions for Austria

[Released to the press November 20]

The Department of State announced today that effective December 1, 1950, no Allied Force permits will be required of American citizens desiring to enter, the United States, United Kingdom, or

French zones of Austria. On the basis of a bilateral United States-Austrian agreement, citizens of the United States will be able to enter Austria on the basis of a valid American passport only. However, in order to travel into the Soviet zone of Austria and to Vienna, the occupational force travel permit (grey pass) will continue to be required.

The United States, United Kingdom, and French Governments have taken this step in abolishing the requirement of Allied Force permits into their zones of Austria in accordance with their desire to normalize the relations between Austria and the occupation powers and to discontinue as far as possible all restrictive controls in Austria.

RIAS Revives Clown Program

[Released to the press November 13]

Comrade Otto Pieckewitz, who for months delighted East Germans by arguing Communist ideology and SED party slogans to their illogical and absurd conclusions, is being revived by RIAS, the American radio station in Berlin, because a flood of fan mail from Soviet zone listeners demands the clown's return to the airways.

Every Saturday night for 5 months, Comrade Pieckewitz entertained RIAS listeners by acting the role of a "two hundred percent Communist." Since September 16, when the radio station discontinued the program, there has been an unending torrent of letters from the Soviet zone insisting on the return of Pieckewitz.

"He has helped us remember how to laugh," has been the tenor of most letters, RIAS officials said. Pieckewitz, who hilariously burlesqued the self-stultifying Communist credo, is therefore shortly being returned as a regular Saturday night feature on the RIAS program schedule.

No Communist slogan was too obtuse for Pieckewitz to explain laboriously and naively. No new piece of Communist legislation—such as that which proclaimed "the right of women to work is guaranteed"—was too obviously inane for him toorate piously on its virtue.

Comrade Pieckewitz understood the overriding role of communism on the sports field, in the housewife's kitchen, and in the uranium mine. And, to the uproarious entertainment of his listeners, he explained this role, glowingly and ponderously.

Once he explained the Soviet zone import-export program as follows: "We sell bricks to Italy in exchange for lemons. The lemons go to Denmark for butter. We trade the butter to Sweden for steel. We send the steel to Russia in exchange for clay which we use to manufacture more bricks for Italy . . ."

What the Voice of America Does

by Foy D. Kohler

Chief, International Broadcasting Division¹

The Voice of America is only one phase of this Government's over-all information and cultural exchange program which includes such media as publications, motion pictures, libraries and institutes, and the exchange of students and professors, of experience and skills wherever those activities are possible.

In physical terms, the Voice of America is a great international radio network, operated at present from 38 short-wave transmitters in the United States, located in the Boston and New York areas, near Cincinnati, in the Midwest, and on the West Coast. These transmitters are partly owned by the Government and partly by private corporations which engaged in short-wave broadcasting before the war. All are operated for us by private licensees—NBC, CBS, General Electric, Westinghouse, World Wide Broadcasting Corporation, and Allied Broadcasters—with whom there are excellent relations. These transmitters not only deliver a direct radio signal to target areas abroad, but, even more important, they feed our relay bases. These relay bases, all of which are Government-owned or -leased, are located on the European side in England, Germany, Tangier, and Greece. On the western side, relay bases are located in Hawaii and in the Philippines. They pick up the radio signal and boost it along to the listener by both short and medium wave.

During the past 2 years, the Congress has approved about 50 million dollars to improve and strengthen our transmitter stations both at home and abroad. Part of the work has already been accomplished, and the rest is going forward as rapidly as construction permits. Over the next couple of years, new equipment will constantly be coming into operation which will help us to break through Soviet jamming and to increase our world audience. The Soviet Union will, in fact, be ringed by United States radio relay bases, and the Voice of America will be capable of reaching practically every radio-receiving set in the world.

¹This article is based on remarks made before the Ohio Foreign Policy Association at Columbus on Oct. 11.

Program Operations

In terms of our program operations, this transmitter network is at present on the air 24 hours a day in English and in 24 foreign languages. Every day, nearly 70 separate programs go out and about 200,000 words. Under present expansion plans, these figures will be practically doubled during the coming year. By the end of 1951, every day will find the United States pouring out nearly half a million words of the American story in half a hundred languages. These programs originate almost entirely from offices and studios in New York headquarters, with some assistance from a branch office and studios in Washington, whence they travel by land lines to the transmitters. They contain materials from all corners of the earth and from every section of the United States. Press services, special cables, Washington reports, thousands of American and foreign language newspapers, magazines, and books are included in the raw materials blended into the Voice of America. In addition, Special-Events teams are continually covering the country to get authentic on-the-spot descriptions of the sights and sounds of America at work and at play and to give voice to the stories of American citizens of all categories. There are now about 650 people engaged in this program operation, in addition to nearly 400 concerned with the operation of our facilities and other support services. When our expansion is completed, Voice personnel will number about 2,000.

Voice of America programs vary a great deal, since each is specially tailored for the audience to which it is directed. Generally speaking, they are centered around a news file and features intended to provide a full and fair picture of what goes on in the world and how the American Government and the American people see it. They seek, in the language of the basic law governing our activities,

to promote a better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen international cooperative relations.

As a matter of over-all average, these programs consist 31 percent of news, 56 percent of analysis and features, and 13 percent of music. More specifically, our programs to countries behind the iron curtain contain almost entirely news, political, economic and social commentary, and features about American life. They are fairly hard-hitting, calculated not only to inform these suppressed and isolated peoples but also to maintain their awareness of the falsehoods being conveyed to them by their present masters and to sustain their hopes for a better tomorrow.

Outside the iron curtain, the Voice seeks to give our friends a better understanding of American policies and viewpoints and of the American way of life. These programs contain much less news since the listeners are abundantly provided with news by their own free information facilities; but they do give the American view on the news and contain many more "Americana" features, as well as music. In brief, they more closely resemble the type of radio fare that one gets from domestic stations. In many instances, these programs are actually picked up and relayed to foreign audiences by the domestic networks of friendly countries. This situation is true, for example, in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, and Iran as well as in many places throughout Latin America. A very fine cooperative relation exists with the American radio industry and many of the programs on the domestic network are given freely by the companies and the artists and musicians and writers involved for use overseas. Some American domestic radio productions—*The Telephone Hour*, *The Hit Parade*, *University Theater*, *Adventures in Science*, for example—are getting to be as well-known abroad as they are at home.

In addition to the direct radio transmissions, the broadcasting division also produces and distributes transcribed programs. About 15,000 platters are shipped monthly to the hundreds of American missions throughout the world and are placed on domestic stations of friendly countries everywhere.

Increasing Audience

Whom do we reach and how effective are we? In general terms, we are broadcasting to a total potential audience of nearly 300 million people every day. We do not pretend to reach all of these every day or to know with real accuracy exactly how many we do reach and what the impact of our programs is on them. An optimistic estimate is that we are being listened to by as many as 100 million people around the world. The science of international audience surveys and program evaluation has not reached the same stage of tested efficiency internationally that it has domestically. However, the procedures and techniques employed by the domestic radio industry are available, with some adaptation, to employ in measuring our au-

Survey Group To Study Voice Problems

[Released to the press November 24]

The Department of State announced today the creation of an overseas field mission for the development of methods of improving the effectiveness of the Voice of America's expanding broadcast operations.

The survey will be conducted by Merrill Phillips, representing the Department's International Broadcasting Division; James D. Shouse, chairman of the Board of the Crosley Broadcasting Corporation, representing the domestic United States radio industry; and William J. Convery Egan, representing the overseas field operations of the Department of State's International Information Program.

The group will leave November 25 for Europe, with later visits scheduled to the Far East and Latin America. The mission will take about 3 months to complete its survey.

The survey will study the practicability of increasing programming in the field and will develop recommendations for means of integrating the production of radio programs in the field with broadcasts originating from the Voice of America studios in New York.

diences and testing the effectiveness in the friendly countries.

A survey in Germany, for example, shows that 50 percent of all residents—not of all radio owners but of all residents—of Germany are fairly regular listeners to the Voice of America programs. In France, a series of surveys showed that we have a total of 4.5 million French listeners, 2.5 million of whom report themselves as regular daily customers, which is more than the circulation of all the great Parisian newspapers. In Finland, where we have no special program, there are 270,000 people who are listeners of the Voice of America, presumably mainly to the English and German language programs; and 67,000 of these say they listen regularly. In Sweden, where we also have no native language program, the survey shows 480,000 occasional and 94,000 regular listeners. A survey in Korea, just before the invasion, showed that 80 percent of a selected group of officials and intellectuals—the public opinion leaders—listen to the Voice programs. From the free areas of the world, we have the somewhat unscientific but still well-recognized measure of listeners mail. This listener response has been constantly increasing and during the last few months has reached a new level of over 30,000 letters. Similarly the demands for the program booklet, carrying the times and other information about our scheduled programs, have increased regularly. About 800,000 copies of each issue are distributed and we may have to increase the printing to at least a million.

Indications of Effectiveness

Evaluation of the audience and effectiveness behind the iron curtain is, of course, more difficult. But in this case, too, we are not without resources. One of the most important of these takes the form of attacks continuously made upon us by the Soviet and satellite regimes through their own press and radio. These attacks come every day and are obviously calculated to combat the effectiveness with the listeners in those areas. Of course, they give us valuable advertising at the same time. They are also invaluable testimony as to the extent to which we continue to get through Moscow's jamming. An important Soviet magazine *Novyi Mir*, for January of this year, contained a review of a new play now being presented throughout the Soviet Union which is actually entitled the "Voice of America." In this review, there was a very significant admission which is translated as follows:

"The Voice of America"—to millions of Soviet people these words, with which the slanderous American radio broadcasts are announced, have become synonymous with lying and provocative fictions.

The abuse to which we are here subjected is not important. We can take that without quivering and have taken it in great quantities. What is important is the admission by this official Soviet organ that we are in fact reaching "millions of Soviet people." Then, there are other sources of information from inside the iron curtain. A very sure one is the constant stream of defectors and former prisoners of war. A returned German prisoner of war wrote this rather picturesque English:

Having just returned from Russian captivity, I wish to inform you that I have experienced in Russia that your transmissions in Russian language are paid attention to and that the Russians like very much to listen in for them.

Even the officials of the Ministry of National Security occupied in our camps sent off the prisoners of war whom they were trying at 9 o'clock in order to hear the Voice of America. Next day the party men of course assured one another that it was a big twaddle what they had told on the Voice of America—but they heard it every one!

The Cost in Contrast to War

What does all this cost? During the past year the 25-language, relatively feeble Voice of America cost the American people about 10 million dollars. The expanded level of 50 languages will take about 25 million dollars. Even then, the budget will be only about equal to the radio-advertising budget of a considerable number of individual American firms for advertising their products domestically; the Voice will cost for a year only about as much as 1 minute of actual war on the scale of World War II. The entire expanded information program of the United States Government will run to less than 60 million dollars a year. This effort looks feeble not only beside the billions going to other purposes but also in comparison

with similar efforts of other countries. Britain is expending nearly as much for similar purposes and, hard-pressed as she is, counts it a good investment. As for the Soviet Union, one does not know how great Moscow's propaganda expenditures are; it is clear that it cost the Kremlin more just to try to isolate the Russian people by jamming than the United States spends on radio programs to the whole world.

Radio as an Instrument of Modern Diplomacy

To see how the American people have come more and more to realize that international radio is indeed an instrument of foreign policy—a proved method of modern diplomacy with great potentials—has been a satisfaction. We have been slow as a people in realizing the importance of this instrument. We have permitted others to take the initiative and to fill the world with lies and distortions about us, and our relative silence has been interpreted as a sign of weakness. This is not because we did not know the principles. They were in fact known and practiced by our founding fathers, to the great advantage of our young Republic. "Truth will ultimately prevail," said our revered George Washington. "Truth will ultimately prevail where there are pains taken to bring it to light." In this modern world, the pains required are considerable. But if we are prepared as a people to make the effort, patiently and determinedly, to make the truth prevail, then, undoubtedly, we will be able to bring light where now is darkness. We will be able to dispel the web of ignorance, prejudice, and ill will which so dangerously divides the world today.

Herbert S. Bursley Resigns as Ambassador to Honduras

On November 15, 1950, President Truman accepted the resignation of Herbert S. Bursley as American Ambassador to Honduras. For the text of Mr. Bursley's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release of that date.

Stanton Griffis Resigns as Ambassador to Argentina

On November 17, 1950, President Truman accepted the resignation of Stanton Griffis as American Ambassador to Argentina. For the text of Mr. Griffis' letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release of that date.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During November 1950

Third North American Regional Broadcasting Conference: Second-Session.	Washington	Sept. 6-Nov. 16
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Meeting of Transport Experts.	Bangkok	Oct. 24-Nov. 4
Economic Commission for Europe:		
Timber Committee	Geneva	Oct. 30-Nov. 2
Committee on Coal	Geneva	Nov. 22-25
Permanent Central Opium Board: 56th Session.	Geneva	Oct. 31-Nov. 18
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Middle East Regional Air Navigation Meeting: Second Session.	Istanbul	Oct. 17-Nov. 7
Fourth Meeting of Wool Study Group.	London	Oct. 2-Nov. 11
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain: Sixth Congress.	Madrid	Oct. 12-Nov. 10
South Pacific Commission: Sixth Session.	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 20-Nov. 2
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Petroleum Committee, Third Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-Nov. 4
Governing Body, 113th Session	Brussels	Nov. 15-25
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Council: Tenth Session	Washington	Oct. 25-Nov. 1
Special Session	Washington	Nov. 3-11
Council: Eleventh Session	Washington	Nov. 13-14
Central and South African Transport Conference	Johannesburg	Oct. 25-Nov. 16
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Meeting of Experts on International Copyright	Washington	Oct. 23-Nov. 4
Executive Board, 24th Session	Paris	Nov. 2-10
Meeting on Improvement of Bibliographical Services	Paris	Nov. 7-10
Second Regional Seminar on Social Affairs	San Salvador	Nov. 5-17
Third Inter-American Congress on Brucellosis	Washington	Nov. 6-10
FAO-WHO Panel of Experts on Brucellosis	Washington	Nov. 6-12
Conference on Survey Authorities	Wellington, New Zealand	Nov. 6-18
57th Convention of the Association of U.S. Military Surgeons	New York City	Nov. 9-11
North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping	Washington	Nov. 13-16
Meeting of the Commission of Finance and Transfer of the International Office of Public Health.	Paris	Nov. 14-15
Thirteenth International Oilculture Congress	Seville, Spain	Nov. 15-(1 wk.)
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), Special Meeting on Automatic Distress Signal Alarm Devices.	London	Nov. 7-16
United Nations:		
International Children's Emergency Fund:		
Program Committee	Lake Success	Nov. 9-10
Executive Board	Lake Success	Nov. 24-25
Economic and Social Council:		
Joint Committee of Principal Opium Producing and Drug Manufacturing Countries.	Lake Success	Nov. 14-28

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of November 30, 1950

United Nations:

General Assembly: Fifth Session	Lake Success	Sept. 19-
Economic and Social Council:		
Eleventh Session, Second Part	Lake Success	Oct. 12-
Economic Commission for Europe: Grain Trade Meeting	Geneva	Nov. 14-
International Tin Conference	Geneva	Oct. 25-
Seminar on Public Personnel Management	Lake Success	Oct. 30-
2nd Social Welfare Seminar for the Arab States in the Middle East.	Cairo	Nov. 22-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Air Navigation Commission: Fifth Session	Montreal	Sept. 19-Dec. 12
Council: Eleventh Session	Montreal	Sept. 27-
Air Transport Committee: Eleventh Session	Montreal	Sept. 28-
Special African-Indian Ocean, European-Mediterranean, North Atlantic Regional Meteorological Meetings.	Paris	Nov. 8-
Air Navigation Commission: Fourth Session of Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control Division.	Montreal	Nov. 14-
Inter-American Seminar on Biostatistics	Santiago	Sept. 25-
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
Third Round of Tariff Negotiations of the Contracting Parties	Torquay, England	Sept. 28-
Fifth Session of the Contracting Parties to GATT	Torquay, England	Nov. 2-
Tripartite Conversations on Security Export Controls	London	Oct. 17-
Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany	London	Oct. 24-
U.S.-Commonwealth Wool Discussions	Melbourne	Nov. 15-
Caribbean Commission: Eleventh Meeting	Curaçao	Nov. 24-
West Indian Conference: Fourth Session	Curaçao	Nov. 27-
ILO: Textiles Committee: Third Session	Lyon, France	Nov. 28-

Scheduled December 1–February 28

Fourth Inter-American Conference on Agriculture	Montevideo	Dec. 1-
FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization):		
Latin American Regional Conference (Concurrent with Inter-American Conference on Agriculture).	Montevideo	Dec. 1-
Latin American Forestry and Forest Products Commission: Third Session.	Santiago	Dec. 11-
Technical Meeting on Cooperatives	Port-of-Spain	Jan. 22-
Indo-Pacific Council of Fisheries, Third Meeting	Madras	Feb. 1-
Meeting on Agricultural Extension	Turrialba (C. R.)	Feb. 3-
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Narcotic Drugs Commission, 5th Session	Lake Success	Dec. 1-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Technical Conference on Flood Control	New Delhi	Jan. 7-
Regional Conference of Statisticians	Rangoon	Jan. 22-
Subcommission on Iron and Steel: Third Session	Lahore	Feb. 12-
Committee on Industry and Trade	Lahore	Feb. 14-
Seventh Session	Lahore	Feb. 22-
Economic, Employment and Development Commission: Sixth Session.	Lake Success	Jan. 15-
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	Lake Success	Jan. 22-
UNESCO:		
Second International Conference of University Representatives	Nice	Dec. 4-
First Regional Conference of the National Commissions of the Western Hemisphere.	Habana	Dec. 8-
Mid-Century White House Conference on Children and Youth	Washington	Dec. 3-
First Latin American Congress of Orthopedics and Traumatology	Montevideo and Buenos Aires	Dec. 8-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Asian Advisory Committee: Second Session	Indonesia	Dec. 17-
Asian Technical Conference on Cooperatives	Karachi	Dec. 26-
Indigenous Labor, Committee of Experts: First Session	La Paz	Jan. 16-
ICAO: Legal Committee, Seventh Session	Mexico City	Jan. 2-
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Standing Committee on Administration and Finance	Geneva	Jan. 7-
Executive Board, Seventh Session	Geneva	Jan. 22-
International Commission on Large Dams: Fourth Session	New Delhi	Jan. 10-
Indian International Engineering Exhibition	New Delhi	Jan. 10-
Sectional Meeting of the World Power Conference	New Delhi	Jan. 10-
Conference of Flood Control	New Delhi	Jan. 10-
Centenary Celebrations of the Geological Survey of India	Calcutta	Jan. 10-

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

North Atlantic Ocean Shipping Board

[Released to the press November 10]

Huntington T. Morse, special assistant to the administrator of the Maritime Administration, served as chairman at the second meeting of the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping conducted at the Department of State on November 13. Mr. Morse was also chairman of the United States delegation.

Vice chairman of the delegation was John W. Mann, Shipping Policy staff of the Department of State.

Other members include:

Advisers

Capt. Clarence Broussard, United States Navy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense

Percy Chubb, member, Sea Transport Mobilization Survey of the National Security Resources Board; Chubb and Son, New York City

Hugh Gallagher, member, Sea Transport Mobilization Survey of the National Security Resources Board; vice president, Matson Navigation Company, New York City

Lester M. Haddad, Munitions Board, Department of Defense

Ralph Keating, member, Sea Transport Mobilization Survey of the National Security Resources Board; president, Refrigerated Steamship Company, Inc., New York City

Serge Koushnareff, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Commodore Robert C. Lee, member, Sea Transport Mobilization Survey of the National Security Resources Board; executive vice president, Moore-McCormick Lines, New York City

Carl E. McDowell, Transportation Office, National Security Resources Board

James W. Swihart, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

Secretary

William H. Ketner, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Agriculture (Inter-American) and Latin American Regional Meeting (FAO)

The Department of State announced on November 20 that Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture, has been named by President Truman to serve as chairman of the delegation which will represent the Government of the United States at the fourth Inter-American Conference on Agriculture to be convened at Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 1, as well as at the Second Regional Meeting on Food and Agricultural Programs and Outlook in Latin America of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) which will be held concurrently with the fourth Inter-American Conference on Agriculture. The President has designated Philip V. Cardon, Administrator, Agricultural Research Administra-

tion, Department of Agriculture, as vice chairman of the United States delegation.

Other members of the delegation are as follows:

Members

Joseph A. Becker, chief, International Commodities Branch, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Hugh H. Bennett, chief, Soil Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture

Clarence A. Boonstra, agricultural attaché, American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Henry B. Bosworth, director, Tropical Forest Experiment Station, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, Rio Piedros, Puerto Rico

Guy L. Bush, head, Latin American Section, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

James P. Cavin, head, Division of Statistical and Historical Research, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture

George D. Clyde, chief, Division of Irrigation, Soil Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture, College Hill, Logan, Utah

Philip M. Davenport, agricultural attaché, American Embassy, Santiago, Chile

Byron C. Denny, chief, Branch of Land Classification, Bureau of Land Management, Department of the Interior

Maurice L. Du Mars, Office of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture

Dale E. Farringer, agricultural attaché, American Embassy, Montevideo, Uruguay

Howard Gabbert, chief, Field Party, Food Supply Division, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, San José, Costa Rica

Harold K. Hill, assistant administrator for Production, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

John A. Hopkins, agricultural attaché, American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Avery S. Hoyt, chief, Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, Department of Agriculture

Kenneth R. Iverson, president, Institute of Inter-American Affairs

Warren Kelchner, *Secretary General*, chief, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Edward I. Kotok, assistant chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

Orion J. Libert, *Administrative Secretary*, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Ross E. Moore, chief, Technical Collaboration Branch, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Mrs. Jean H. Mulliken, specialist on commercial and commodity policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

John R. Neale, director, Food Supply Division, Institute of Inter-American Affairs

Wesley R. Nelson, assistant commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior

Joseph A. Orozco, *Language Officer*, Department of State

Albion W. Patterson, chief, Field Party, Food Supply Division, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Asunción, Paraguay

Fred J. Rossiter, associate director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Robert M. Salter, chief, Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils and Agricultural Engineering, Department of Agriculture

Bennett T. Simms, chief, Bureau of Animal Industry, Department of Agriculture

Frank H. Wadsworth, chief, Tropical Forest Experiment Station, Forest Management Research, Department of Agriculture, Rio Piedros, Puerto Rico

William W. Walker, counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Montevideo, Uruguay

Milburn L. Wilson, director of Extension Work, Department of Agriculture
Mrs. Kathryn H. Wylie, *Technical Secretary*, Latin American Division, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

The two Conferences are to be held concurrently to enable the participating governments to consider both the technical and the economic aspects of agriculture in relation to each other. The fourth Inter-American Conference on Agriculture will be concerned mainly with technical subjects: the protection and utilization of water; land use and crop improvement; livestock development; the processing, preservation, and distribution of farm products; and the problems of small farms and livestock units. The agenda for the FAO meeting stresses the economic aspects of agriculture in the Latin American region, in particular the economic implications of the food and agricultural programs of the participating governments, the improvement of agricultural economic advisory and information services, the improvement of agricultural statistics and censuses, and programs for the maintenance of national food and agricultural reserves. The two Conferences will also hold joint sessions for the consideration of topics of common interest, such as the provision of technical assistance and other types of mutual aid for improving agriculture and bettering the conditions of rural people.

The series of Inter-American Conferences on Agriculture resulted from a resolution of the Sixth International Conference of American States held at Habana in 1928. The first Conference was held at Washington in 1930, the second at Mexico City in 1942, and the third at Caracas, Venezuela, in 1945. The first FAO Latin American regional meeting was held at Quito, Ecuador, in November 1949.

West Indian Conference

The Department of State announced on November 21 that delegates of 14 dependent territories of the Caribbean region will assemble at Curaçao, Netherland West Indies, November 27-December 11, for the fourth session of the West Indian Conference held under the auspices of the Caribbean Commission.

The Conference, which has the distinction of being the first international conference in which there was direct participation by representatives of non-self-governing peoples, was inaugurated in 1944. Its function is to provide a system of regular consultation with local representatives on matters of common interest in social and economic fields. Dr. H. Riemens, Netherlands Minister to Venezuela and a Netherlands Commissioner of the Caribbean Commission, will preside over the Conference.

The central theme of the Conference, the Agricultural Problems of the Caribbean, is a subject of prime importance to the area. Technical

papers have been prepared by outstanding experts of the four member governments and Caribbean territorial Governments as well as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Labor Organization. In addition to these papers, there will be motion pictures, slides, and other visual aids on such topics as soil conservation and fertility, animal husbandry, land settlement, rural housing, extension services, marketing, agricultural labor, and mechanization.

Delegates will be present from the French Departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana; the Netherlands territories of Surinam and the Netherland West Indies; the British colonies of Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Leeward Islands, and the Windward Islands; and the United States territory of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.

The eleventh meeting of the Caribbean Commission will convene simultaneously with the Conference. Recommendations of the Conference will be considered by the Commission along with the financial, administrative, and policy questions involved. These recommendations approved by the Commission will be submitted to member and territorial Governments as a basis for the formulation of concrete action. Other items to be considered by the Commission at this meeting include its 1951 budget, the role of the Caribbean Commission in technical assistance projects, and methods of achieving uniformity in collecting trade statistics throughout the area.

United States Commissioners attending the Conference and Commission meetings will be: Ward M. Canaday, United States co-chairman; Judge William H. Hastie; Dr. Rafael Pico (Puerto Rico); and Jesus T. Pinero (Puerto Rico).

The United States advisers will be Robert R. Robbins (principal adviser), Elizabeth H. Armstrong, both of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State; Cedric Philipp, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State; Charles F. Knox, American Consul General in Curaçao; James P. Davis, Director of the Office of Territories, Department of the Interior; and Roy D. Hockensmith, Soil Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture. Mrs. Virginia B. Lewis, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, will serve as Executive Secretary to the United States group.

Third Inter-American Congress on Brucellosis

On November 6 the Department of State announced that the third Inter-American Congress on Brucellosis would be convened at Washington, D. C., on that date. The United States Government will be represented at the meeting by the following delegation:

Chairman

Dr. Carl L. Larson, director, Public Health Service, Rocky Mountain Laboratory, Hamilton, Mont.

Delegates

- Dr. Birdsall N. Carle, chief, Brucellosis Unit, Microbiological Institute, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Md.
Dr. E. C. Gentry, chief of the Medical Division, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Veterans' Administration
Dr. L. M. Hutchings, professor of veterinary science, Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind.
Lt. Col. Ludwig R. Kuhn, MSC, chief, Department of Bacteriology, Army Medical Department, Research and Graduate School, Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C.
Dr. Abner K. Kuttler, head of Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Division, Bureau of Animal Industry, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture
Dr. Dwight Lichty, Public Health Service, assigned to Wisconsin Health Department, Madison, Wis.
Dr. Carroll K. Mingle, assistant head of Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Division, Agriculture Research Administration, Department of Agriculture
Commander Frank R. Philbrook, MC, USN, Navy secretary, Committee "X," Research and Development Board, Department of Defense
Lt. Col. William D. Preston, chief, Internal Medicine, Department of the Air Force
Dr. John Scruggs, Public Health Service, Assigned to Indiana State Board of Health, Indianapolis, Ind.
Dr. Bennett T. Simms, chief, Bureau of Animal Industry, Agriculture Research Administration, Department of Agriculture
Dr. Wesley W. Spink, associate professor, Division of Internal Medicine, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
Dr. James H. Steele, chief, Veterinary Public Health Division, Communicable Disease Center, Public Health Service, Atlanta, Ga.
Dr. W. T. S. Thorp, chief, Comparative Pathology and Hematology Section, Experimental Biology and Medicine Institute, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Md.

Brucellosis is a bacterial disease common to human beings, as well as to animals. In its attack upon human beings, where it is frequently referred to as undulant fever, it constitutes a real threat to public health. In its widespread attack upon livestock in the Western Hemisphere, it has created serious economic and veterinary problems for countries in the Americas because of large losses in livestock and the resulting decreases in milk, milk products, and meat production.

The Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the Inter-American Committee on Brucellosis, and the Committee on Public Health Aspects of Brucellosis of the National Research Council are jointly sponsoring the forthcoming meeting for the purposes (1) of reviewing the advances in research on brucellosis since the Second Congress, held at Mendoza, Argentina in November 1948; (2) of establishing uniform methods of diagnosis of the disease; and (3) of considering measures for treatment and control. There will be formal discussions of all phases of the disease, including its medical, veterinary, public health, and economic aspects. Scientific papers will be presented on bacteriology,

veterinary research, research in human brucellosis, epidemiology, and control.

All the governments of the Western Hemisphere, several European countries, and organizations concerned with human and veterinary medicine have been invited to send representatives.

FAO: Special Session

On November 3 the Department of State announced that Clarence J. McCormick, Under Secretary of Agriculture, would serve as the United States member at the special session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations which convened at Washington, D. C., on that date.

Other members of the United States delegation are:

Alternate United States Members

Stanley Andrews, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture
Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, Department of State

Associate United States Member

Fred J. Rossiter, Associate Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

James F. Anderson, Division of International Administration, Department of State
Philip V. Cardon, Administrator, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture
Ursula Duffus, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Stanley B. Fracker, Research Coordinator, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture
Francis A. Linville, Economic Resources and Security Staff, Department of State
F. Marion Rhodes, Director, Office of Requirements and Allocations, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture
Ralph S. Roberts, Director of Finance, Department of Agriculture

Adviser and Secretary

James O. Howard, Head, Division of Foreign Agricultural Information, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

The special session of the Conference has been called pursuant to a decision of the ninth session of the Council of FAO held at Rome in May 1950. The main purpose of this session is to consider financial and administrative matters in connection with the forthcoming move of the FAO headquarters from Washington to Rome. At this session, the Director-General will report to the 63 member governments of FAO on the arrangements for the transfer, which have been virtually completed with the Italian Government. Other important matters which the Conference is expected to consider are technical assistance, commodity problems, applications for membership by four nations, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and a proposed international plant protection convention.

The last regular session of the Conference was held at Washington, D.C., in November and December 1949.

Vyshinsky "Doctrine" Called Dangerous to World Peace

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

The General Assembly has voted overwhelmingly for the eight-power resolution entitled "Peace Through Deeds"² and has rejected the Soviet so-called "Declaration on the Removal of the Threat of a New War and the Strengthening of Peace and Security Among the Nations."

The eight-power resolution not only reaffirms that whatever the weapons used, any aggression is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security in the world; it also freshens, modernizes, brings up to date, and makes more complete our concept of aggression by specifically including the latest form of aggression, to wit: fomenting civil strife.

It became perfectly obvious during the Committee meetings, on the one hand, that the Soviet proposal was insincere and, on the other, that the eight-power proposal was an honest attempt to prevent aggression regardless of the fancy dress in which aggression might appear. It is undoubtedly for this general reason that the Soviet proposal was so decisively defeated by the Assembly and that the eight-power proposal was so overwhelmingly approved. It was mysterious why the Soviet delegates, who must have known these facts perfectly well, persisted in opposing the majority effort to characterize aggression a crime against humanity while favoring a proposal which was really a transparent fake.

For some time, the basic reason was not clear. But it became clear as we studied carefully the speech which Mr. Vyshinsky made in the First Committee.

In this speech, Mr. Vyshinsky, first, made the point that there were just wars and unjust wars.

He said, secondly, that a war against an aggressor who has invaded your country was a just war—which is true since it involves the right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter.

He said, thirdly—and this is the significant part—that a war is also just if it helps to destroy what he characterized as "capitalism" or "imperialism."

Here is the complete quotation from Mr. Vyshinsky on this point:

Lenin said that just wars are those which are designed to liberate people from capitalistic slavery. According to Lenin a just war is not an aggressive war but a liberating war which is designed either to defend people from foreign attack and from attempts to enslave it, or the liberation of people from capitalistic slavery, or else the liberation of colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of the imperialists.

¹ Made before the General Assembly on Nov. 18 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1950, p. 767.

To this, Mr. Vyshinsky added the observation that the United Nations Charter "enshrines and blesses a defensive war, the kind of war spoken about by the great Lenin and now spoken about by the great Stalin, the teacher of the people."

This astounding concept means, in effect, that, if one nation dislikes the social and economic system of another country, it can go to war on that country, and it will not be considered an aggressor.

This is the Vyshinsky doctrine.

Now, you may not like the social and economic system of another country. We have made no attempt to conceal the fact that we consider the Soviet regime dictatorial and oppressive. We think the Russian people would be better off and happier if their Government would allow them to think for themselves and to get out and see the world.

But that does not mean that we would classify a war to destroy the Soviet regime, or any system of the Soviet type, as "just."

If the Soviet Union were again the victim of an aggressor, as it was in June 1941, the United Nations would join to suppress that aggression.

But the Soviet regime does not hold out any such assurance to the rest of us.

For, according to Soviet definitions, a war against any state could be considered "just" simply by calling the state "capitalistic" or "imperialistic."

But we should also point out that the United Nations Charter does not "enshrine" or "bless" any kind of war. It calls all wars a "scourge" which "twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."

The world should carefully ponder Mr. Vyshinsky's remark because it flies squarely in the face of the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. We cannot accept the principle that it is not aggression to go to war on a state simply because it has an economic system of which you disapprove.

If you read Mr. Vyshinsky's statement, you cannot deduce any other meaning.

In fact, this is the only way in which to explain the Soviet support of their own so-called peace proposal and the Soviet opposition to the Committee peace proposal.

It is the only way to explain the fact that the Soviets have described as aggressors the majority of the United Nations who joined to suppress aggression in Korea. Apparently, because the majority of the United Nations have non-Soviet economic and social systems, they are, under the Vyshinsky doctrine automatically branded as aggressors even though the obvious truth is that they are trying to suppress aggression.

It is this doctrine which explains all the upside-down language and double talk with which the Soviets have shown so dramatically in the past few years how not to make friends and influence people.

It is this declaration which marks the place where, insofar as doctrine is concerned, the Soviets got off on the wrong foot.

This doctrine of Mr. Vyshinsky's is singled out not merely because it explains the opposition of the Soviet Union to the various attempts of the United Nations to prevent aggression. I am putting the magnifying glass on this significant paragraph because it may lead to a cure of this disease of ever-threatening war from which the world is now suffering. If only the Soviets will abandon this idea that it is not an aggression to wage war on a country which has a different economic system or a different social system, we will have gone a long way toward promoting peace.

There is, of course, no doubt whatever that countries with different economic and social systems can live side by side without war. But this cannot happen if one country considers it a virtue to go

to war on another country simply because that country is different. We ask the Soviets to abandon this idea, and we submit that, if this doctrine were abandoned, the Soviet delegation could readily support such measures as the eight-power resolution. We believe that, if this doctrine were abandoned, peaceful coexistence and the peaceful negotiation of difference might very well become as natural to us as life itself.

We express the hope that the Soviet delegates who are here at the United Nations explain to their Government in Moscow that the doctrine that it is not aggression to attack a country with a different economic and social system is false as to fact, untrue in all its basic assumptions as to human existence, and highly dangerous to the peace of the world.

U.S. Position on Secretary-General's 20-Year Peace Program

*Statements by John J. Sparkman
U. S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

The General Assembly undertakes its discussion of this item at a time when the issues of peace and war have been exhaustively debated, and when, as a consequence, it would be difficult to avoid repetition in any lengthy discussion of the subject. Today, therefore, I should like to make only a brief statement setting forth our general views in regard to appropriate action by the General Assembly on the memorandum of the Secretary-General.²

Scope of Secretary-General

Let me say first that the United States has given very careful study to the memorandum. We have taken into account the concrete suggestions made in it. We shall continue to do so.

We do not believe that any voice should be raised in criticism of the Secretary-General for the action he has taken in preparing and publishing his memorandum. True, it was an unprecedented action. It is, however, fully within the scope of the powers of the Secretary-General, as we construe them, under chapter 15 of the Charter. In our view, he should always feel free to bring to the attention of governments and peoples every-

where any proposals he may have which are calculated to bring about a more peaceful world.

To say this is not to state that the United States necessarily agrees in detail with each of the Secretary-General's specific points. It will be clear from a review of the position of the United States Government on a number of the issues covered in the Secretary-General's memorandum that his views as to the proper action to be taken are not in all cases in accordance with our own.

With the basic objective and purpose of the memorandum, however, we do not see how any government can disagree. It is eminently proper for the Secretary-General of this organization to seek the employment of Charter principles and United Nations resources on a long-term basis to relieve tensions and move toward lasting peace. That is what the Secretary-General has attempted to do. That is what every right-thinking member of this organization is attempting to do. Nothing but good can come from a fruitful exchange of suggestions, proposals, and ideas which will contribute to the attainment of this objective.

Accomplishments Toward Goal

The United States does not believe that it would be particularly useful at this time to discuss each of the specific proposals made by the Secretary-General. Many of the suggestions included in the

¹ Made before the plenary session of the General Assembly on Nov. 18, and released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly on the same date.

² BULLETIN of June 26, 1950, p. 1051. See also, U.N. doc. A/1304.

memorandum have already been under discussion in the Committees of the Assembly and in its plenary sessions. This Assembly has made great strides toward the organization of peace—toward the utilization of the resources of the United Nations Charter to prevent aggression and to combat it when it has started. The resolution on uniting for peace, adopted by the Assembly on November 3, and the Yugoslav proposal on the duties of states in the event of aggression, are two striking examples of the progress made at this session of the General Assembly toward the organization of peace.³ The action we have just taken on the resolution entitled "peace through deeds" has emphasized the need for faithful fulfillment of Charter objectives; for good faith in international relations; and for fundamental human rights and freedoms, if a lasting peace is to be attained.

Since the Secretary-General prepared his memorandum, the turbulent pace of world events has carried us into a situation which differs notably from that existing when the memorandum was prepared. The chain of events which began on June 25 in Korea could not have been foreseen by Mr. Lie. This is not to imply that the long-range purposes of the memorandum have been affected in any essential degree by the developments relating to Korea. It does mean, however, that certain specific action proposals made by the Secretary-General might require some modification if we were to consider them closely at this time.

In view of the record of achievement of this Assembly, we do not think that such a course need now be undertaken. Rather, we favor the resolution tabled by nine states, which provides an opportunity for organs of the United Nations to consider in a thorough-going fashion such of the proposals as lend themselves to concrete action.

We shall vote for this resolution. We shall cooperate in the work of the organs which decide to examine sections of the memorandum. We shall continue to give our attention to every worthwhile suggestion which might advance the cause of international peace and security.

Soviet Attempts To Mislead Assembly

Mr. President, I should like to say just a word about the Soviet draft resolution. That resolution seems to me to add very little to the joint draft resolution. It asks us to "approve for consideration the item relating to the development of a twenty-year programme for achieving peace." We are already considering this subject, and under the joint resolution, the organs of the United Nations will carry on that consideration in a useful way.

But then the Soviet draft attempts to commit the General Assembly to a number of points which are favorite Soviet propaganda themes—well-worn themes which this Assembly has often re-

jected in other resolutions and other forms.

The second paragraph of the Soviet draft resolution does not in our opinion merit the sympathetic consideration of the General Assembly. It consists of a number of individual points, plucked out of context and hastily put before the General Assembly at the last moment, apparently in the hope that through seductive language and veiled intent, they can be sold to this Assembly.

Mr. President, the joint draft resolution provides for reference of all the points covered in the memorandum to the appropriate organs of the United Nations for their consideration. The proper forum for debating such observations as members may have on the points covered in the memorandum is the various organs of the United Nations. Snap decisions should not be taken by the Assembly as a whole on matters which require study by other organs and Committees.

Moreover, Mr. President, a number of the subparagraphs of paragraph 2 of the Soviet resolution bespeak an effort by the Soviet Union to prejudice the unbiased consideration of the points raised in the Secretary-General's memorandum. This is done by attempting to put the Assembly on record in favor of the Soviet Union's own opinions as to the way in which these points should be carried out. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union professes to consider it essential that provision be made for the holding of periodic meetings of the Security Council, but only if the representative of the Chinese Communist regime participates in such meetings. Mr. President, this provision is objectionable on two grounds. In the first place, quite apart from the opposition of my Government to any move to seat the Chinese Communists in any United Nations organ, this Assembly now recognizes the Chinese National Government as the Government of China and could hardly agree to the language of the Soviet draft. If the Assembly should ever wish to change its decision, this would definitely not be the way to do it. Second, we do not believe, on constitutional grounds, that the General Assembly should purport to speak for the Security Council in determining the representation of members of that body.

The second subparagraph of paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft refers to compliance with the principle of unanimity. Mr. President, insofar as it is the Soviet intention to say that all members should be guided by the provisions of the Charter with respect to the unanimity rule, no one could disagree. But to that extent this paragraph merely reaffirms something which is in the Charter, and we, therefore, see no need for writing it into a General Assembly resolution—if that is all the Soviets mean to do. If they have any other purpose—and it may be that they mean to imply that there has been some deviation from the observance of Charter principles in connection with the unanimity rule—then we say that this Assembly is not open to criticism on that score and that we should allow no opening for such criticism, ex-

³ BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

press or implied, and should therefore decisively reject this subparagraph.

With regard to subparagraph (c), I need only say that this matter is fully covered in the resolution on peace through deeds⁴ approved by the General Assembly yesterday, and in prior resolutions passed by the General Assembly over a period of years. We shall oppose this subparagraph as well.

As to subparagraph (d), it involves a complex set of problems which have been considered for many months in the Military Staff Committee. If the Soviets have a new proposal to make on this subject, it is for them to present it in the Military Staff Committee in order that that body may give it the study which it merits. Certainly, the General Assembly should not go on record here and now, without such a study, in behalf of a vague statement whose meaning to us at least is by no means clear.

Turning to the last two subparagraphs of the Soviet draft, I can only say that again we are dealing with matters which rightfully should be considered by the Economic and Social Council and the Economic Committee of this Assembly before they come before the plenary session. In fact, those items have been dealt with in those bodies, and I do not believe, insofar as I can tell at first reading, that the language of subparagraphs (e) and (f) contains any new material.

These things being so, the United States would not wish to prejudice the consideration of the memorandum of the Secretary-General by the organs of the United Nations through the inclusion of the language in the Soviet draft resolution. We shall vote against it in all its parts and we urge other members to do the same.

Mr. President, there cannot be too many efforts to reach the goal of peace. We are not so sanguine as to believe that we can reach it by one sudden or startling impulse. Like the Secretary-General, we think we are engaged in a long-term process of evolution toward better standards of international behavior. The members of the General Assembly have made progress, despite great obstacles, in the search for peace in the last 5 years. The United States is confident that the organization will continue to advance toward this goal in the years to come.

[Later in the debate Senator Sparkman made the following remarks.]

Mr. Vyshinsky's bitter attack on the 20-year peace program of Secretary-General Lie is further evidence of Soviet resentment at the firm stand that Mr. Lie took on behalf of United Nations principles at the time that the Republic of Korea was invaded.

Mr. Vyshinsky made it quite clear today that his country will support no program for world peace which does not comply in its entirety with Soviet demands which the United Nations has fre-

quently examined and found wanting during the past 4 years.

The Soviet program, as he outlined it, would render the United Nations incapable of action without Soviet permission. It would force the United Nations to adopt the Soviet demand for an atomic energy program without adequate safeguards. It would force on the United Nations a plan for United Nations armed forces that military experts of the world have found useless and inadequate.

Mr. Vyshinsky tries to bulldoze into the Lie peace program United Nations recognition of the Chinese Communist government, although only 17 of the 60 members of the United Nations legally recognize that government.

Mr. Vyshinsky declares in effect that he supports the idea of technical assistance—but only on Russia's terms—and the economic chains with which Russia has bound the Eastern European countries make Mr. Vyshinsky's meaning quite clear to the rest of the world.

If deeds, not words, are to be the criteria, we may note that the Soviet Union thus far has not contributed a single penny to the technical assistance program of the United Nations.

If the United Nations then accepts everything that the Soviet Union demands, the Soviet Union will support a 20-year peace program.

It seems to me that this bartering of peace on the part of the Soviet Union is something that the free world cannot accept.

General Assembly Resolves To Study Plan

U.N. doc. A/1539
Adopted Nov. 20, 1950

The General Assembly,

HAVING CONSIDERED the "Memorandum of points for consideration in the development of a 20-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations" submitted by the Secretary-General (A/1304),

NOTING that progress has been made by the present session of the General Assembly with regard to certain of the points contained in the memorandum of the Secretary-General,

REAFFIRMING its constant desire that all the resources of the United Nations Charter be utilized for the development of friendly relations between nations and the achievement of universal peace,

1. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his initiative in preparing his memorandum and presenting it to the General Assembly;

2. *Requests* the appropriate organs of the United Nations to give consideration to those portions of the memorandum of the Secretary-General with which they are particularly concerned;

3. *Requests* these organs to inform the General Assembly at its sixth session, through the Secretary-General, of any progress achieved through such consideration.

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1950, p. 767.

Proposed Study of Sino-Soviet Relations Supported

*Statement by John Foster Dulles
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

The United States supports in general the proposal that we try to get the full story of what took place between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China during the period since 1945. This information will, we think, throw light on the whole murky situation in Asia and help this organization to keep on the right path for the future. We have just set up a Peace Observation Commission so as to have, hereafter, more reliable processes of exposure which might deter potential aggressors. Here, the proposal is to look into the past. But these past events are not disconnected from the present and from the future. To look into them may serve a constructive purpose and not be merely academic.

The situation in Asia is in a state of flux. There are charges and countercharges. The United Nations has to deal with situations where much depends upon what it thinks are the motives and purposes of the countries concerned. Perhaps, what happened in the 1945 period and since will reveal a pattern of conduct which needs to be understood if we are to deal correctly with the other problems of Asia.

Stalin's 1924 Lectures

Those who are familiar with Soviet communism will recall Stalin's classic 1924 lectures on the foundations of Leninism, now incorporated in the current edition of Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*. He, there, says that "Soviet power is the most internationalist of all state organizations" for it seeks the amalgamation of all "into a single state union." He goes on to discuss the strategy of achieving that "single state union." He analyzes the world situation and the then vulnerable position of the colonial powers in Asia. He sees there the possibility of mortally weakening the West by an Asiatic policy which will not only deprive the

Western powers of their colonies but bleed them in a futile effort to hold them. He concludes "The road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism."

Then, he puts this question: Can "the revolutionary possibilities latent in the revolutionary liberation movement . . . be utilized for the proletarian revolution, that the dependent and colonial countries can be transformed from a reserve of the imperialist bourgeoisie into a reserve of the revolutionary proletariat?" To achieve that transfer requires what he calls a two-phased—what we might call a "two-faced"—program. In the first phase, the Soviet Union would whip up and support the nationalistic aspirations of the people so that they will rebel against their colonial rulers. But, he recognizes, this nationalism if it goes too far could be a barrier to the later "transformation" of these areas into the Soviet Communist "reserve" and prevent what he refers to as the eventual "amalgamation" of the liberated peoples into the Soviet's "single state union."

So Stalin explains that, after the first phase, when nationalism is to be exploited as a weapon against the Western powers and before that nationalism becomes consolidated and vigorous, there must be a second phase in which, as he puts it, there is "the necessity of fighting against the national insularity" and against those "who do not want to rise above their national steeple." That fighting against nationalism is necessary, he says, to insure "the subsequent amalgamation of all nations."

The first phase of "liberation" in Asia has now been largely accomplished though not in the way that Stalin hoped. He had hoped for violent revolution rather than peaceful evolution. In fact, we have witnessed the greatest peaceful transformation known to history as is proved by the presence here of eight nations representing

¹ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 21 and released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly on the same date.

more than 500 million people who were in the non-self-governing category in 1945.

Soviet Fear of National Independence

The liquidation of colonialism has come so fast that, it seems, Soviet communism feels it must now hurry into its so-called "second phase," lest national independence become so strong and vigorous as to obstruct the planned transfer of these areas into the Soviet reserve.

We may find, if we look closely into the matter before us, that it discloses the technique of transition from Stalin's first phase to his second phase. If so, that may give us insight into much else that is going on in Asia, and with which this organization may have to deal.

The National Government of China, whatever its defects from the domestic standpoint, had at least been an instrumentality for freeing China from external encroachments. For nearly 20 years, it had led the fight against Japanese penetration, whether open or disguised, through a Chinese puppet government. With the help of its Western allies, it had won that desperate struggle. In the process, it had also brought about the abolition of the many extraterritorial rights and special privileges with which China had been burdened, and it had ended the foreign control of its taxes and its customs.

Throughout this struggle to preserve the territorial integrity of China and to abolish the special privileges of foreign governments, the United States had consistently given its influence, and finally its armed might, that China might in every sense of the word be free and independent. In 1941, the United States took the risk of terrible war rather than recognize what was ostensibly a Chinese government exercising much *de facto* authority in China, but which, we knew, was, at heart, the tool of Japanese imperialism.

By the summer of 1945, it seemed that the Chinese could concentrate on internal reforms without fear of being absorbed or torn apart from without. But, as Japan, in the 1930's, became fearful of growing Chinese nationalism, so it seems that, in 1945, Soviet leaders became fearful that China would become such a strong independent nation that it could not readily be "transformed" into the Soviet Communist "reserve." Perhaps, they, then, decided that the time had come to apply to China the "second phase" of Soviet strategic treatment, the phase of "amalgamation" with the Soviet Union.

Historical Résumé Since 1945

In August 1945, the Soviet Union made, at Moscow, some hard agreements with the National Government of the Republic of China, going much beyond what the United States had conceived to be the terms of agreement envisaged at Yalta.

The agreements were all tied into a treaty given the pleasing title: *Treaty of Friendship and Alliance*. By these arrangements, the Soviet Union got control of the key ports and railroads of Manchuria and, in effect, brought the Manchurian area under the dominant influence of the Soviet Union. The inducement offered by the Soviet Union was this undertaking:

The Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China.

Mr. Molotov, as Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, stipulated that that undertaking would "constitute a part of the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship and Alliance," a treaty which was to remain in force for a term of 30 years.

But it seems that once the Soviet Union had what it wanted in Manchuria, it forgot its 30-year undertaking to support only the National Government. It not only withdrew that support, but less than 5 years later (February 1950) it concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance and mutual aid with the enemies of the National Government. In consequence, the mainland of China is today dominated by a regime which, it seems to us, subjects that area to foreign influence to a greater degree than ever in China's modern history. Events suggest, and the facts when known may prove, that, for China, the independence phase passed and the second phase has begun, when China is to be amalgamated into the Soviet Communist "reserve."

The events we are asked to study may expose a vast scheme of imperialism lurking behind an outer mask of benevolence toward the national aspirations of the people. There is risk of a gigantic fraud which might be disastrous—disastrous in the first instance to the peoples who have newly won their independence, because that independence will be taken from them; and, in the second place, disastrous to many others for Soviet leaders have openly represented their Asiatic policy as being part of their larger, global strategy.

If Asia is being subjected to aggression cloaked by fraud, then exposure is a good preventive. We believe that all friends of China, whether they recognize the National Government or the People's Government, should be glad to get at the real facts.

No doubt the top leaders of the so-called "People's Government" know what they are doing, for they are profound students of Stalinism. But we can believe that most of the members and supporters of the Chinese People's Government are first of all Chinese, who want to build up a great Chinese nation. They may be quite unaware of the deceit that, we believe, is being practiced upon them. They know that they are, today, getting the "moral support and aid" that, in 1945, was promised wholly to the National Government. But that may be only a passing gratification. For next year, or the year after, if they cling to the vestiges of Chinese national independence, it will

probably be another and more compliant group that will be getting that support.

Purpose To Obtain All the Facts

All of us have a natural reluctance to look unpleasant facts in the face. It is more agreeable, at least for the moment, to ignore the possibility of a master plan of world-wide import, each move of which affects us all. We know vaguely that such a plan has been published, that it has been adhered to steadfastly, and that already one-third of the human race has been subjected to it. But, still, we like to cling to the hope that what happens in some other part of the world is due only to local causes and is of isolated significance. We should like to think that what has happened in China is only due to internal ills.

Of course, in China, as in the other countries, there have been ills and maladjustments. They are particularly acute in China, and it is quite likely that, had there been no such thing as Soviet communism, China would have had a postwar phase of revolution and convulsion. When such internal distress prevails, it should be the occasion for what our Charter calls good neighborliness, where all try to help. It is a matter of grave concern if, when a nation gets sick, some great power tries to impose on it what President Truman in his recent San Francisco address called "a new colonialism—Soviet style."

We believe that recent events in China may present a case history which, if adequately explored, documented and reported, will serve further to alert the people of Asia and the Pacific and indeed of all the world to a danger to which none of us can be indifferent.

As regards the text of the proposal, we consider that its terms are such that its adoption will not condemn anyone or endorse anyone. The purpose is to get at the facts. We assume that the fact-finding body would not be made up of states but of competent and impartial individuals who might, for example, be appointed by the Interim Committee on the nomination of the Secretary-General. The Commission, we understand, would not—indeed could not—have authority to investigate where it was not wanted or to require any government to disclose what that government preferred to keep concealed. It would merely gather such information as would be normally available to it and which it deemed authentic.

It seems to the United States delegation that the circumstances justify us in taking this moderate course.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Action by the United Nations. International Organization and Conference Series III, 57. Pub. 3965. 11 pp. 10¢.

A pictorial insight into the ways in which the members of the United Nations are attacking the new and old problems of war, ignorance, poverty, and disease.

U.S. National Commission UNESCO News, October 1950. Pub. 3970. 16 pp. 10¢ a copy; \$1 a year domestic; \$1.35 a year foreign.

Prepared monthly for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Our Foreign Policy. General Foreign Policy Series 26. Pub. 3972. 100 pp. 25¢ a copy.

Includes an explanation of our foreign policy and its direction toward national security, economic well-being, and wider freedom.

Diplomatic List, October 1950. Pub. 3983. 161 pp. 30¢ a copy; \$3.25 a year domestic, \$4.50 a year foreign.

Monthly list of foreign diplomatic representatives in Washington, with their addresses.

Reviewing American Foreign Policy Since 1945. General Foreign Policy Series 35. 166 pp. [BULLETIN Reprint] Free.

Statement by Senator Tom Connally presented to the Senate on Sept. 22, 1950.

United Nations Action in Korea Under Unified Command: Fifth Report to the Security Council, October 5, 1950. International Organization and Conference Series III, 60. 6 pp. 5¢.

Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea, for the period, September 1-14, 1950.

How a Trade Agreement Is Made. Commercial Policy Series 132. Pub. 3990. 6 pp. Free.

A fact sheet explaining the steps followed in reaching decisions on tariff concessions which the United States may ask or offer in making a trade agreement under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947).

A New Page in History. International Organization and Conference Series III, 61. Pub. 4000. 12 p. Free.

An address by President Truman before the United Nations General Assembly, Flushing Meadow, N. Y., October 24, 1950.

The Question of Formosa

*Statement by John Foster Dulles
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

I am going to suggest that we should defer and put to a later place on our agenda this item of the question of Formosa.

We put the item of the question of Formosa on the agenda because, as our Secretary of State said in his opening statement² to the Assembly in general debate,

It is the belief of my Government that the problem of Formosa and the nearly 8 million people who inhabit it should not be settled by force or by unilateral action. We believe that the international community has a legitimate interest and concern in having this matter settled by peaceful means.

That is basically the reason, Mr. Chairman, why we asked that this item be placed on the agenda, and we still believe that the item should stay on the agenda.

We do, however, suggest that it should not be considered at the present time.

When the Secretary of State spoke, as I indicated, in September, it seemed at that time that there was a reasonable prospect that peace and security would be reestablished in Korea speedily and satisfactorily by the action of the United Nations and its forces there. I am sorry to say that that prospect has now been, in recent days, considerably changed by the rapid and substantial increase of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The situation that results creates a very serious problem both for the United Nations and for my own Government.

A resolution dealing with the intervention in Korea is now pending before the Security Council and is being considered.

We feel, therefore, that a discussion here of the interrelated problem of Formosa might not be conducive to helping the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility for peace and security in the area which, as I say, we consider to be at the present time, as a result of the circumstances I referred to, very serious. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that this item of the question of Formosa should be deferred to a later place on our agenda and I hope that by that time there will be a further clarification of the situation and it can then be freely discussed as a long-range problem without the danger of its complicating, in any way, the present grave and difficult task of the Security Council.

¹ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 15 and released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1950, p. 526.

[Later in the debate, Mr. Dulles made the following remarks responding to a Soviet statement.]

If the delegate of the Soviet Union understood correctly the interpretation of what I said, I had not said that this question should be postponed until there could be an arrival here of the representatives of the Chinese so-called government.

I am quite sure, Mr. Chairman, that the interpreters could not fall into such a grievous error. I am quite sure that what Mr. Malik says he thinks I said is a case of the wish perhaps being followed by the thought. It is not a case of error by the interpreters.

I never suggested in any degree whatsoever that the motivation for my proposal for adjournment was to allow the Chinese Communists to get here. Quite the contrary, the one reason I hesitated to urge the adjournment was that it might be interpreted, as it has been misinterpreted—I am afraid—deliberately by the honorable delegate of the Soviet Union.

What I did say was that, in the light of the conduct of this so-called government, things we can't shut our eyes to—the intervention in north Korea, the invasion of Tibet, the great aid to Ho Chi-minh in Indochina, and the threats of invasion of Formosa—we face the situation, Mr. Chairman, of the risk, at least, that that whole area may be engulfed in aggressive war.

If that is going to happen, then a discussion here of the long-range future of Formosa would be somewhat academic.

The primary task of the Security Council is to do everything it possibly can to be sure that that great disaster does not occur, and the only reason, Mr. Chairman, why I suggested the postponement of the discussion here was lest by misventure, in the course of our debate here, we might say something about this delicate problem which might make more difficult the already difficult enough task of the Security Council.

U.S. Not To Send Vessels to Antarctica During 1950-51

[Released to the press November 22]

The Government of the United States is pleased to learn that, being anxious to avoid any misunderstanding in Antarctica which might affect the friendly relations between Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom, the Governments of these three countries have informed each other that in present circumstances they foresee no need to send warships south of latitude 60 degrees during the 1950-51 Antarctic season, apart, of course, from movements such as have been customary for a number of years.

The United States Government does not contemplate sending any vessels to Antarctica during the 1950-51 Antarctic season.

Reports on Palestine Sought From Mixed Armistice Commissions

U. N. doc. S/1907
Adopted Nov. 17, 1950
Vote 9-0-2

The Security Council,

RECALLING its resolution of 11 August 1949 wherein it noted with satisfaction the several armistice agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict in Palestine; expressed the hope that the governments and authorities concerned would at an early date achieve agreement on final settlement of all questions outstanding between them; noted that the various armistice agreements provided that the execution of the agreements would be supervised by Mixed Armistice Commissions whose chairman in each case would be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or his designated representative; and, bearing in mind that the several armistice agreements include firm pledges against any further act of hostility between the parties and also provide for their supervision by the parties themselves, relied upon the parties to ensure the continued application and observance of these agreements,

TAKING into consideration the views expressed and the data given by the representatives of Egypt, Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization on the complaints submitted to the Council: (S/1790, S/1794, S/1824),

Notes that with regard to the implementation of Article 8 of the Israeli-Jordan Armistice Agreement the Special Committee has been formed and has convened and hopes that it will proceed expeditiously to carry out the functions contemplated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article,

Calls upon the parties to the present complaints to consent to the handling of complaints according to the procedures established in the Armistice Agreements for the handling of complaints and the settlement of points at issue,

Requests the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission to give urgent attention to the Egyptian complaint of expulsion of thousands of Palestine Arabs, and

Calls upon both parties to give effect to any finding of the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission regarding the repatriation of any such Arabs who in the Commission's opinion are entitled to return,

Authorizes the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization with regard to the movement of nomadic Arabs to recommend to Israel, Egypt and to such other Arab States as may be appropriate such steps as he may consider necessary to control the movement of such nomadic Arabs across international frontiers or armistice lines by mutual agreement, and

Calls upon the Governments concerned to take in the future no action involving the transfer of such persons across international frontiers or armistice lines without prior consultation through the Mixed Armistice Commissions,

Takes note of the statement of the Government of Israel that Israeli armed forces will evacuate Bir Qattar pursuant to the 20 March 1950 decision of the Special Committee, provided for in Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, and that the Israeli armed forces will withdraw to positions authorized by the Armistice Agreement,

Reminds Egypt and Israel as Member Nations of the United Nations of their obligations under the Charter to settle their outstanding differences, and further reminds Egypt, Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that the armistice agreements to which they are parties contemplate "the return of permanent peace in Palestine", and, therefore, urges them and the other States in the area to take all such steps as will lead to the settlement of the issues between them,

Requests the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to report to the Security Council at the end of 90 days, or before, if he deems necessary, on the compliance given to this resolution and upon the status of the operations of the various Mixed Armistice Commissions and further requests that he submit periodically to the Security Council reports of all decisions made by the various Mixed Armistice Commissions and the Special Committee provided for in Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement.

THE DEPARTMENT

Henry G. Bennett Appointed Point 4 Administrator

The President announced on November 14 the appointment of Henry Garland Bennett as Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration in the Department of State. In that capacity, he will direct the Point 4 Program of Technical Cooperation with the people of underdeveloped countries. Dr. Bennett is expected to assume his new duties on December 1.

Dr. Bennett succeeds Capus M. Waynick, Ambassador to Nicaragua, who has been on detail as Acting Administrator of the new Point 4 Program since last May.

Appointment of Officers

Orlando A. Simmes as Executive Director of the International Claims Commission, effective October 29, 1950.

Thomas C. Mann as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, effective November 10.

Books Presented to Burma Translation Society

On October 13, the United States Information Service presented 191 books to the Burma Translation Society. The presentation was made by the Ambassador, David McKendree Key, and accepted by the Prime Minister, Thakin Nu, in his capacity as president of the Society. Accompanying the Ambassador for the occasion were George W. Edman, public affairs officer; Randolph R. Haven, information officer; and Mrs. Zelma S. Graham, librarian.

The books include *The Encyclopedia Americana* (30 volumes), *The World Book Encyclopedia* (19 volumes), Compton's *Picture Book Encyclopedia* (15 volumes), and a wide variety of works on science, education, social studies, and history.

Text of Ambassador Key's Remarks

I congratulate you, Mr. Prime Minister, for being the father of this robust and growing child, the Burma Translation Society. I note that the date of birth was sometime in August 1947, more than 3 years ago.

In this time, the Society has accomplished much. An impressive list of books has been published and you have other books and manuscripts in various stages of compilation. I hope the books being presented today by the United States Information Service will eventually either find their way into your language or will be of basic use to members of your Society in their work. They include encyclopedias, works on history, science, education, and social studies.

I like the three main objectives of your Society. I think they are worth repeating:

1. To undertake the translation into Burmese of any publication in English or other foreign language, which is likely to be conducive to the intellectual and cultural development of the indigenous races of Burma;
2. to undertake or encourage the translation into any foreign language of any of the standard works in the Burmese language or any of the languages of Burma;
3. to institute or encourage research in Burmese literature and the fine arts with a view to bringing about an improvement in mass education and, thereby, raise the standard of literacy in Burma.

If the Society holds to these objectives, its influence will be far reaching. It will be contributing definitely to the education of the great masses in your country and to a fuller understanding between peoples by breaking down the language barriers. By these two things alone, it will be working for lasting peace in a strife-torn world. I am sure all of us subscribe to your objectives.

Therefore, it is a genuine pleasure to present these books from America. In making the presentation, I want to congratulate again all members of the Society for their past endeavors and wish them continued success.

Text of the Prime Minister's Response

Mr. Ambassador, we are very thankful to you for these valuable books, presented by the United States Information Service. There has been a close tie of American-Burmese friendship, which has become more noticeable recently, and a new link is being added to that chain of amity by the presentation of these books. These books will certainly be good weapons in the hands of the Society to fight against ignorance as the Society stands for the advancement of knowledge in Burma. Such gestures of good will make for closer ties between the two countries. By having these books translated into Burmese, the people of Burma will have a wider outlook on life and international affairs. Such understanding will do away with strife and enmity between nations, and peace will reign supreme. The gift of these books by the United States Information Service will be instrumental in fighting against ignorance in this land. And further, I look forward to receiving similar help from other countries. Once more, Mr. Ambassador, let me thank you on behalf of the Society for the presentation of these valuable books.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

Commercial Operation of Vessels on the Great Lakes.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Maritime Affairs of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H. R. 7377—a bill to authorize the commercial operation of the vessels *Cornwall*, *Johnstown*, and *Saucon* on the Great Lakes. H. R. 7954—A bill to authorize the commercial operation of certain vessels on the Great Lakes. May 16 and 17, 1950. 81st Cong., 2d sess. 64 pp.

Permitting Free Entry of Articles Imported From Foreign Countries for the Purpose of Exhibition at the International Food Exposition, Inc., Chicago, Ill. H. Rept. 2562, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 496] 2 pp.

Strengthening the Common Defense by Providing for Continuation and Expansion of Western Hemisphere Production of Abaca by the United States. H. Rept. 2586, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 3520] 4 pp.

Annual Report: Office of Alien Property, Department of Justice; Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1949. H. Doc. 458, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Department, indexed) 140 pp.

Supplemental Estimates of Appropriation for the Department of State and the General Services Administration. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting supplemental estimates of appropriation for the fiscal year 1951, in the amount of \$89,000,000, for the Department of State and the General Services Administration. H. Doc. 641, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 3 pp.

Situation in Korea. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report on the situation in Korea. H. Doc. 646, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 11 pp.

The United States in the United Nations

November 24-November 30, 1950

General Assembly

No plenary sessions were held this week.

Committee I-(Political and Security).—In a week filled with portent for the United Nations, Committee I began discussion on November 24 of the Soviet complaint regarding "aggression against China by the United States." Both sessions of the 24th, however, were devoted almost entirely to the consideration of a Soviet resolution, which was finally adopted 30-8-22 (the U. S. abstained), calling for representatives of the People's Republic of China to participate in the Committee discussion. On November 27, Mr. Vyshinsky opened debate on the agenda item with a lengthy recital of familiar Soviet allegations concerning American action in the Far East and ended by introducing a resolution calling for a General Assembly request to the Security Council to put an immediate end to the alleged aggression against China by the United States.

United States Delegate John Foster Dulles refuted the Soviet charges of aggression and pointed out that "Throughout a long history the United States has consistently acted as a friend of China, and we have sought in every way to maintain the political and the territorial integrity of China, to promote the well-being of China, and to aid China in cultural, and in humanitarian endeavors." He added, "I think that all decent and peace-loving people cannot but feel a contempt for those from the outside who, to serve their own well-known Asian ambitions, seek to replace that friendship, confidence, and peace with hatred, fear, and fighting."

The Committee then adjourned in view of the Security Council's consideration of the Formosa and Korean questions.

Ad Hoc Political Committee.—On November 25, the Committee approved 38-14-8 the resolution sponsored by the United States and 13 other nations, which recommends that Eritrea be constituted as an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia.

Consideration of assistance to Palestine refugees was completed on November 27 with adoption of the 4-state resolution, cosponsored by the United States, which authorizes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency during the coming fiscal year to continue direct relief in the amount of 20 million dollars and to establish a 30-million-dollars reintegration fund for refugees. Debate then began on a subcommittee resolution on the recognition of the

representation of a member state. As amended and subsequently approved on November 28 by a vote of 29 (U. S.)-7, with 15 abstaining, the resolution recommends that any controversy over representation should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and that the other organs and the specialized agencies of the United Nations should take into account the attitude adopted by the General Assembly and Interim Committee.

Committee II-(Economic and Financial).—The Committee completed general debate on action for full employment on November 27 and subsequently approved an amended Chile-Pakistan-Peru-Uruguayan resolution commending the vigorous action taken by the Economic and Social Council on this subject. Committee II also gave unanimous approval to two Cuban resolutions: one on organization and collection of employment data; the other on the effect of mechanization on unemployment.

Committee III-(Social, Humanitarian and Cultural).—Committee debate centered on the question of refugees and stateless persons. Conclusive action was forestalled by disagreement over definition of the term "refugee", and voting on the draft resolutions was postponed pending discussion of a compromise definition submitted by the United States and seven other nations.

Joint Committee II and III.—By a vote of 35-0-5 (Soviet bloc) the Joint Committee approved on November 25 the Economic and Social Council resolution on the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. Prior to this action, the Committee adopted by a vote of 35 (U.S.)-0-7 a separate resolution containing the recommendations of Committee V on financing the program.

Committee IV-(Trusteeship).—The Committee, on November 24, adopted by 39-5 a report recommending General Assembly approval of the Somalia draft trusteeship agreement. It then passed two amended resolutions submitted by the Special Committee on Information. On November 25, the Committee approved 26-10-7 (U.S.) a resolution calling for information on the extent to which the rights of the Human Rights Declaration are applied in the territories. The United States stated it had voluntarily furnished information before the Declaration had come into existence, and although it believed this resolution deserved great consideration, it favored postponement because: (1) the Declaration was not a treaty imposing legal obligations, and (2) other United Nations bodies were considering the question on

a broader basis. However, the United States would endeavor to observe the provisions of the adopted resolution.

Committee V-(Administrative and Budgetary).—Among the many items approved by the Committee this week were the following: The 1951 appropriations for the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB); a compromise sum for the Advisory Council for Somaliland; 1951 appropriations for the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, and those for the 1951 International Law Commission.

A resolution implementing the Committee on Contributions' recommendations for 1951 was also approved 37 (U.S.)-7-1. Among the significant changes in the new scale are an increase in U.S.S.R.'s contribution by 0.64 percent and reduction of United States' assessment by 0.87 percent. Unanimous approval was given to the Secretary-General's resolution for a modified United Nations Telecommunications system and authorization to accept such voluntary contributions or donations necessary to carry out the proposals in the plan.

Committee VI-(Legal).—Committee VI completed consideration of the report of the International Law Commission by adopting on November 27 an amended Cuba-France-Iranian resolution calling for creation of a 17-member committee to draw up one or more preliminary draft conventions and proposals relating to the establishment and statute of an International Criminal Court, which was followed later by appointment on November 29 of the 17 members; and by completing discussion on Parts V and VI. The Committee also adopted almost unanimously on November 29 a United States resolution on revised procedure for the registration and publication of treaties; and on November 30 adopted a Philippine resolution for the issuance of commendation ribbons or other insignia for the United Nations forces fighting in Korea, which was opposed by the Soviet bloc only.

Security Council

World attention was focused on the Security Council which began consideration of the Korean and Formosan agenda items with representatives of the Chinese Communists and the Republic of Korea present. The decision to link the two items was made on November 27, following rejection of a Soviet proposal to consider the Formosa question first and separately.

Substantive debate was opened November 28 with Ambassador Warren R. Austin as the first speaker. He made it clear that "the problem is the gravest one now confronting the world," stating that "Chinese Communist armed forces totaling more than 200,000 men are now engaged in North Korea" and labeled their intervention as "aggression, outright and naked." Asking whether "their intervention was really in the interest of

the Chinese people," he continued by outlining the neutralization of Formosa by the United States and the action of the United Nations in regard to Korea. Mr. Austin cited the long record of Chinese-American friendship and directed at the Peiping representative important questions concerning Chinese Communist intervention. He concluded: "The United Nations objectives in the Far East, as everywhere in the world, are to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations way with disputes is to seek every means of settling them peacefully . . . The Chinese Communist regime by its actions, as well as its statements, has caused grave doubts to arise in the minds of people all over the world. What the United Nations now seeks is an assurance of the peaceful intent of the regime at Peiping. More important than that assurance, it seeks deeds which will demonstrate that its intent is genuine. Only if these deeds are forthcoming, can China's neighbors, and the people of the world, feel assured that peace and security will be restored in the Far East."

Ambassador Austin's statement was followed by a bitter attack by the Chinese Communist representative, General Wu Hsiu-chuan, in which he accused the United States of "armed aggression" against Formosa and Korea. He would not reply to the questions raised by the United States representative. Debates on these issues, in which only the Soviet Union expressed support for the unfounded charges of the Chinese Communists, were completed on November 30. The two resolutions submitted by the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists were decisively rejected by 1 (U.S.S.R.) 9-0 (India not participating). The Soviet proposal requested the Security Council to condemn the United States for an act of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of China and to withdraw immediately all forces from the island of Taiwan (Formosa) and from other Chinese territories. The Chinese Communist proposal, sponsored by U.S.S.R., requested the Council to condemn the United States Government for armed aggression against Taiwan, and armed intervention in Korea; and to demand withdrawal of armed forces of the United States and all other countries from Korea.

The six-power resolution sponsored by Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, United Kingdom, and the United States, which noted the intervention of Chinese military units in Korea against United Nations forces, calling for the withdrawal of these forces, and affirming recognition and protection of legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone, was defeated by U.S.S.R. veto, 9-1-0 (India not participating).

Correction: In the BULLETIN of November 13, page 771, the heading should read as follows: U.S. Supports Resolution for Spain's Membership in U.N. Specialized Agencies.

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